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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays competition become more important value in business. Every 
company needs to be more competitive to stay in business. There are many factor 
that can be decided in term of competition. One factor that affect competitiveness 
is pricing strategy and it affects to competitive value. Competitive value in market 
can be determined by market share and revenue from each company.  
This research aims to understand how pricing strategy can affect company 
value and give competitive advantages to company and their impact to competitive 
parameter. But naturally in pricing strategy each company will offer lower price to 
get more customer but in the other hand cheaper product means lower profit margin. 
Extreme pricing competition can be disastrous for business because buyer is 
sensitive through pricing.  
. The premise is what should we do to response competitor price change? 
To study this behavior through out the year study has been led to two best methods 
to solve the problem, by using game theory and regression (data mining).  
The result shows that market share is more sensitive toward price change 
rather than revenue shares. It Turns out the best decision is to optimize revenue and 
profits by optimizing price setting. The optimum value in profits and revenue will 
be gained by optimum price setting and sales volume. This result also affect all 
scenarios. The best scenario in the scenario testing is scenario with the best 
combination of their price setting regardless what the scenario is. 
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1. CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter will be explain about background of the research, problem 
formulation, objective and benefit of the research, limitation, and writing systematic. 
 
1.1 Background 
At each of every market, there are a large number of different buyers and 
sellers for each good or service available (Hayes, 2018). Facing number of different 
buyers and sellers each party will try their best to get more advantage. It’s common 
knowledge that goal of every sellers is to get more sales from buyer. But, as for 
buyer, their goal is to get cheaper, higher quality, faster, or anything that suit their 
intention from what sellers sells. This situation leads to competition with each entity 
try to achieve their goal.  
Competition in market includes all the actual and potential offers from each 
entity that might consider (Kotler & Keller, 2012). By offers it means there are 
several acts that can affect buying decision. Competition in term of economic means 
the rivalry among sellers trying to achieve such goals as increasing profits, market 
share, and sales volume by varying the elements of the marketing mix: price, 
product, promotion and place (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In a market with many 
buyers and sellers, both the consumer and the supplier have equal ability to compete 
on price. But, buyers and sellers react differently towards price is change. When 
price increases, the willingness of sellers to offer goods will increase, while the 
willingness and ability of buyers to purchase goods will decrease (Whelan & Msefer, 
1994). 
Market situation when there are few seller supplies a large portion of all the 
products sold in the marketplace define as Oligopoly market (Skripak, 2016). As 
the result, sellers need to supplies large portion of product, thus they have had large 
production capacity lead to high initial cost to starting the business, cause number 
of firm entering this kind of market is low. Companies with this characteristic 
categorize as industry. As large firms supplying a sizeable portion of a market, these 




But there’s a catch: because products are fairly similar, when one company 
lower their prices, others are often to follow to remain competitive (Skripak, 2016). 
Therefore, product price is very sensitive. Also, due to similar production process, 
product much likely similar for each sellers to another. In buyers perspective, with 
same quality product, they will choose to buy cheaper product. But how each sellers 
must response to price change is uncertain. Each decision to respon the price change 
whether to follow what competitor do or to ignore it, it’s uncertain how it’s actually 
worth. Decreasing price will likely to gain more demand yet in total return not 
always benefit the companies. Decreasing price lead to decreasing profit margin.   
Increasing the price after decreasing will unlikely to gain previous demand. 
Because some buyer already change their decision to other product that already 
cheaper or called switching behavior (Wu, et al., 2017). Companies can respond by 
lowering their price at exact price as competitor, lower price, or may be just keeping 
the disparity with previous price before change.  
New market entrant may decide to go for (low) penetration price and high 
initial growth or for (high) skimming price and slower initial growth (Kay, 2014). 
Which cause problem to market leader if new entrant decide to penetrate with lower 
price. Market leader will consider to decrease their price to keep their demand or 
ignore it. Best decision need to be taken, Because if they react in a wrong way they 
will lose some buyers and possibly revenue.  
Naturally buyer will start to buy the cheaper product followed by each sellers 
start to decreasing their price (Skripak, 2016). But this consumer switch will not 
change significantly due to unfamiliarity to new product. Because factor to affect 
buying decision is not only price but there’s preference to different quality and 
brand of the product. Willingness to buy a product at low prices is limited by taste 
and not infinite even when the price equals zero. 
As a few number of competitor that involve in oligopoly market, identify loss 
can be done by observe what competitors do. Knowing the relation between total 
sales from each competitor and market share can give a firm ability to managers 
predict their market share (Cooper & Nakanishi, 2010). However, it’s important to 




measure. Companies need to create the right strategy by consider right factor. These 
to overcome dyamic of the market and to stay competitive. 
Oligopolies competitiveness can be measure by evaluating it’s market share 
(Economicsonline, 2017). Market share is effect of all decision taken by all buyers 
and sellers in the market. And it’s only affect by number of sales in the market for 
each sellers. Which means that no matter how big promotion from each companies 
if buyers or customer not interested to buy it’s not affect their competitiveness. 
Measure company value by evaluating it’s market share is reasonable because 
mainly company objective is to get more profit which gain from their sales. 
Osadchiy and Bendoly (2015) find that in a future purchase opportunity, up 
to 79% of customers exhibit strategic behavior. Strategic behavior means  
consumers will prefer to buy later, knowing that will be discounted prices in the 
future instead of paying premium prices up-front (Zhang & Wie, 2018). This 
indicates there’s trend in demand. This indicates that consumer willingness to buy 
product also affected by time window. Furthermore, this affect how companies 
should formulated their competitive strategy. Knowing that there are factor such as 
consumer behavior also need to be consider. 
Market-share analysis is more complex than the sales analysis for a single 
product/brand simply because it’s required to consider competitive factors (Cooper 
& Nakanishi, 2010). Analyze market share need accurate view of market and 
competition and aware of any variable that cause by it’s own decision and what 
affect by other competitors do. Companies need to be able to explain relation 
between factor before analyze the market. Such as Relation between market share 
and price. Relation between competitor price and companies total sales. And 
relation between consumber behavior and companies price setting. Any strategy by 
ignored others response is tend to failure sooner or later, if the structure of the 
markets is oligopoly and monopolistic competition. Wardhani (2016) has been 
formulate pricing strategy in PT. Semen Gresik. Her research formulate necessary 
factor and to able analyse market share due to price change. But not consider 
competitor response. Vena (2016) also succed to formulated competition between 




characteristic by using regression. But once again not consider competitor response 
in long time period.  
Today, game theory approach have been used to analyze business competition, 
but with limited interaction between each other (Bravo, et al., 2010). Game theory 
support strong economical background to describe this phenomenon that define 
competitive actions. It suits the situation because game theory consider competitor 
act to decide best decision. Studies of competition dynamics are usually approach 
by a framework where the players are the companies and all competitor in the 
market. For this particular approach, Nash - Bertrand specification is useful, where 
players compete using prices as strategic variables decision. 
Furthermore, to be able to study about competition in oligopoly market 
researcher need to observe appropriate case. There are many industry that 
categorize as oligopoly market. But to study all phenomena, the case must be 
possible to identify. Cement in one of industry that categorize as oligopoly market. 
It’s sensitive toward price as buyer try to buy cement in bulk price different can 
highly determine buying decision. Recently Indonesia cement industry face many 
problem as the result by government policy that made this case interesting to study. 
Indonesia has positive growth of infrastructure development after release of 
regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 60 Year 2015 on 
Government Work Plan 2016. As the result, Many mega infrastructure mega project 
has been develop in the past 5 years. This is also result of growing economy and 
also government policy to invite more investor to our country. For about 30%-40% 
of infrastructure development is comes from cement and steel (Yovanda, 2017). 
Which cause increasing demand of cement. Increasing demand indicates more sales 
opportunity for cement industry.  
 
Source : www.ey.com 




Indonesia government also creates new policy that invites more competitor 
in this sector for other country. In 2017, there are 10 new competitors in this 
industry (Supriadi, 2015). Indonesian government policy to open other competitor 
in cement industry is to reduce budget in developing infrastructure. This policy also 
leads to rapid increase in production facility which also cause Indonesia’s cement 
market is getting more competitive. 
Average net profitibility margin has been in downward trend in the past 4 
years, as the new players are offering much lower selling price in a market that is 
already oversupplied in an effort to penetrate the market (Ernst & Young, 2016). 
This creates problem to cement industry in Indonesia regardless demand keep 
growing the number of competitor also increasing. Therefore, cement industry 
firms needs to be carefull set their prics. Year-to-date (YTD) sales as of September 
2016 is amounting to 44.7 million tons, increased slightly (2.95%) compared to last 
year YTD sales in the same period. However, month-to-month sales in September 
2016 is declining -3.3% compared to September 2015 (Ernst & Young, 2016). 
Declining sales indicates declining market share that can be caused by many 
problem. If the supply growth higher than the demand it will cause market to be 
oversupplied. Other factor might be declining brand awareness, cheaper product 
from competitor, higher quality product from competitor, or new substitute product 
which in this case is unlikely. As the new competitor begin to penetrate the market 






Source : www.ey.com and Indonesia Cement Association (ASI) 
Figure 1.1.2 Market Share of Cement Players 
 
New entrant have started price discounts since second quarter of 2015 due to 
increase in capacity. Prices offered by the 5 new players: Anhui Conch, Panasia, 
Siam Cement, Cemindo Gemilang and Jui Shin are approximately 20% lower than 
the big three (Semen Indonesia, Indocement, and Holcim) (Ernst & Young, 2016). 
 
Source : www.ey.com 





One of the the new entrant in Anhui Conch. As the new entrant in the 
market it’s fascinating to understand what it should do in the market do gain more 
profits. Further study to discuss how new entrant should react in the market and 
also the previous competitor in the market is needed. There are lot of Anhui Conch 
market region nowadays one of them is at Kalimantan Selatan. Another new entrant 
is Semen SBM that actively compete in Kepulauan Riau. In each of these region 
there are at least one incumbent player such as Holcim and one of Semen Indonesia 
group. 
For two player pricing competition can be found in Aceh region. In this 
region found that only two cement industry that compete in the market. For 
multiplayer Kalimantan Selatan and Kepulauan Riau has new entrant in its region  
that could use as object study. This based on previour research in Wardhani (2017) 
research.  
Price declining indicates problem due to pricing strategies. Is there any 
decision making that can give better result responding this problem. Market leader 
need to start formulate best strategies due to new entrant because in cement industry 
marketing effort is limited compare to another industry such as telecommunication, 
food, or other consumer goods. Better decision making in pricing strategies can give 
a company better competitiveness. 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
The problem formulation in this research is to study pricing competition 
behavior in cement market by identify best decision strategy made in pricing policy 
of cement industries in dynamic game. The scenario will be implemented to identify 




Objective that want to be achieve in this research are: 
1. Developing model to describe interaction between pricing strategy 




2. Evaluate how price can influence revenue and revenue share, market 
share, and profit share and it’s relation to each other. 
3. Evaluate pricing strategy in different perspective from each player. 
Which is market leader, follower and new entrant. 
 
1.4 Benefit 
Benefit that can be gained  from this research is to be able to profiling 
pricing competition behavior by understanding what best strategy in determining 
price in long period of time. Better understanding about pricing behavior can be 
advantage to decision maker in pricing management. 
 
1.5 Scope of the Research 
The scope of this research will be explained in separate point, limitation 
and assumption. 
1.5.1 Assumption 
This research consists of assumption used in strategic form in payoff table. 
1. For revenue share the type of game is assume as Zero-Sum game with 
number of lost sales as consequence price is change is the factor that 
creates it’s zero-sum game. 
2. Each company considers to compete each other in price. 
3. Decision from each company to assest their product price is done 
simultaneously, so they can only know competitor previous price. Not 
at the same time. 
4. The game considers as dynamic game that goes overtime each month. 
1.5.2 Limitation  
Limitation that used for this research to is : 
1. The pricing factor does not consider operating expense. 
2. Data used for this research is monthly sales of cement industry in 
period of time 2014-2016. 
3. The cement variance used as research object is cement with bag 
packaging. 




a. Players at Aceh Region are Semen Padang and Semen Andalas 
Indonesia 
b. Only these two companies compete in this region. 
5. For multiplayer player, data that used is data price and sales volume in 
Kepulauan Riau and Kalimantan Selatan. 
a. Players at Kepulauan Riau are Semen Padang, Holcim 
Indonesia, Semen Andalas Indonesia, Semen SBM, and 
Indocement Tunggal Perkasa. 
b. Players at Kalimantan Selatan are Holcim Indonesia, Semen 
Gresik, Anhui Conch Indonesia, Indocement Tunggal Perkasa, 
and Semen Tonasa. 
c. Only these Players compete in these region. 
 
1.6 Writing Systematic 
This report explain separately in 8 6 chapter, introduction, literature review, 
research methodology, data collecting, data analysis and processing, model 
development, scenario development and behavior analysis, result interpretation and 
analysis, also conclusion and suggestion. Here’s the brief explanation for each 
chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contain the brief explanation about reasoning for this research 
that explain separately in 6 point, background of the research, problem formulation, 
objective that want to achieve, benefit, scope of the research, and report writing 
systematic for this research. 
 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter will be explain about literature review to gain more valuable 
information to help this research. Literature review also done as based reference 
used in this research. some topic will be reviewed is concept of Market Share, , 






CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Third Chapter will explain research flow that show step by step how this 
research is done systematically. This research will be done through 5 brief phase. 
First is literature review, then data collecting and processing, data interpretation and 
the last is analysis and scenario testing and lastly conclusion from the research.  
In this chapter also explain how data needed in the research collected and 
processed. After all data is collected then continue to processing data to designated 
Game Theory model using regression technique. But first the regression model need 
to be developed. In this chapter will also explain about the regression model 
  
CHAPTER 4 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
This chapter explain how data processed. Data first process to develop 
mathematical model that can give result on relation between price and market share 
and other factor that might affect competitive parameter. After that all model and 
data processed in behavior analysis and scenario testing. In this chapter will also 
discussed about the result. 
 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
In last chapter all the result from this research will be concluded and there 










2. CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will explain about theory that used as refence in this research. 
literature that will be reviewed is Market Share, Regression, and Game Theory 
 
2.1 Market Share 
Market shares mean shares of potential consumers (Cooper & Nakanishi, 
2010). These means that market is group of people that potentially buy a firm’s 
product. Those consumer who never buy firm’s product are out of the market. It 
means that eventhough that some people not buy the firm’s product yet it considered 
in counting market shares.  
However, in this case to get the exact knowledge of the potential buyer 
will be hard, so in this research market share that discussed is shares of an actual 
sales. Which is common definition of the market share. Market refered by this 
definition is shares of an actual sales of the product for given period of time and 
geographical area. Market in those situations should be taken as the sales 
performance of a product in the market, rather than a collection of buyers for the 






si  = the market share of firm i 
Qi = the sales (quantity sold or revenue) of firms i’s product 
Q = the total sales (quantity sold or revenue) for the market 
Q = ∑ Qj𝑚𝑗=1  
m = the number of competitor 
 
2.1.1 Kotler’s Fundamental Theorem 
Kotler fundamental theorem speak about relationship between firm’s 
market shares with its marketing activities. It assume that a relevant industry is 





is proportional to the marketing effort of its product (Kotler, 1984). It can be written 
as :  
si = k · Mi 
where: 
Mi = the marketing effort of the product of firm i 
k = a constant of proportionality. 
si = Market share of firm I  
 
 If a firm’s marketing effort were measurable, this theorem indicates that the 
greater the marketing effort of one’s firm the greater should be its market share. But 
in industry where there more than one competitor, the total market share should be 
one and cumulative from all market share of the competitor. Therefore, to describe 
this situation the formula can be written as :  





This last equation says that the market share of firm i is equal to the firm’s 
marketing effort divided by the sum of marketing effort for all competitors in the 
industry. But, how big the marketing effort doesn’t mean the market share is also 
big. How effective the marketing effort also affect how success firm marketing 
strategy is. In this  case marketing effort effectiveness can be describe as α. 
Therefore, the formula can be written as :  
𝑆𝑖 =  
𝛼𝑖 . 𝑀𝑖
∑ 𝛼𝑗 . 𝑀𝑗𝑚𝑗=1
 
 
Kotler assumes that the marketing effort is a function of the marketing mix 
of the company, both in the past and the present. Mathematically can be written as 
follows :  
Mi = f( Pi, Ai, Di, ...) 
where:  
Pi = the price of firm i’s product 








Di = the distribution efforts (e.g., trade allowances given by firm i). 
 
Setting prices and determining the level of advertising expenditures are 
two key in marketing mix variable (Schlosser, 2015). Marketing done to attract 
more buyer and getting more sales. These activity become one important key for 
every business. As been describe by previous fomula, price, advertising 
expenditures affect market share of each firm. 
 
2.1.2 Market-Share Theorem 
Bell, Keeney, and Little consider a situation where, in making a purchase 
of a product, consumers must choose one brand from a set of alternative brands 
available in the market. They posit that the only determinant of market shares is the 
attraction which consumers feel toward each alternative brand, and make the 
following assumptions about attractions (David, et al., 1975). Letting Ai be the 
attraction of brand i (i = 1,2,...,m) and si be its market share,  
Axiom A 2.1 Ai ≥ 0 for all i and  ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑚𝑖=1  > 0 (i.e., attractions are nonnegative and 
their sum is positive).  
Axiom A 2.2 Ai = 0 ⇒ si = 0. (The symbol ⇒ should read “implies,” i.e., zero 
attraction implies zero market share.) 
Axiom A 2.3 Ai = Aj ⇒ si = sj (i ≠ j) (i.e., equal attraction implies equal market 
share). 
Axiom A 2.4 When Aj changes by ∆, the corresponding change in si (i ≠ j) is 
independent of j (e.g., a change in attraction has a symmetrically distributed effect 
on competitive market share). 
 
From those four axioms they show that the following relationship between 
attractions and market shares may be derived.  





The last axiom establishes the relationship between attractions and market 









2.1.3 Alternative Model of Market Share 
There five mathematical model to describe market share. That is Linear 
Model, Exponential Model, Multiplicative Model, MCI Model, and MNL Model. 
Below is the mathematical model from each model. 
1. Linear Model 





2. Exponential Model 






3. Multiplicative Model 


















si  = Market share of firm i 
A𝑖   = attractiveness to brand i  
m  = number of brand  
Xki  = value of variable k in Xk,for brand i 
K = number of variable  
fk   = monotone transformation in Xk, (fk (.) > 0)  
βk   = estimated parameter for brand indluence 
 
2.2 Regression 
There are many ways to determine relationship between each factor. Such 
as coefficient of correlation to examining whether two interval- or ratio-scale 
variables could be related. And one way to determine each relation is by using 
regression. 
Regression analysisprovides a “best-fit” mathematical equation for the 
values of the two variables (Welers, 2010). This mathematical equation can be form 
of linear or curvilinear. Regression use to predict the value of certain factor by 
match it by formulated mathematical equation. The formulation comes from 
identified data and predict it’s value from each pattern of data. 
 
Simple Linear Regression 
The simple linear regression model is a linear equation having a Y-
intercept and a slope, with estimates of these population parameters based on 
sample data and determined by standard formulas (Welers, 2010). The model is can 
be described as follows:  
yi = β0 + β1xi + €I  
Where : 
yi  = a value of the dependent variable, y 
xi  = a value of the independent variable, x 
β0  = the y-intercept of the regression line 





€I  = random error, or residual 
 
the y-intercept for the population of (xi, yi) pairs is β0 and the slope is β1. 
The €I term is used for the random error, or residual, for the ith data. Residual means 
difference between the actual value (yi) and the expected value from the regression 
line that formulated. There are three assumptions use in simple linear regression 
model: 
1. For any given value of x, the y values are normally distributed with a mean 
that is on the regression line,  
2. Regardless of the value of x, the standard deviation of the distribution of y 
values about the regression line is the same. The assumption of equal 
standard deviations about the regression line is called homoscedasticity.  
3. The y values are statistically independent of each other. For example, if a 
given y value happens to exceed, this does not affect the probability that the 
next y value observed will also exceed . 
 
 
2.3 Game Theory 
Game theory is the breakthrough came with John von Neumann and Oscar 
Morgenstern’s book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944. 
Game theory say that in competition each player will act to gain most outcome from 
the game in normal situation. Game theory provides a formal language for the 
representation and analysis of interactive situations, that is, situations where several 
“entities”, called players, take actions that affect each other by their decision 
(Bonanno, 2018). 
Game theory is divided into two main branches. The first is cooperative 
game theory, which assumes that the players can communicate, form coalitions or 
can have all information regarded the game from other player. Second is  Non-
cooperative game where the players are most likely unavle to communicate and 
cant form coalition. It’s simply say that other player gain is our lost. 
In brief, game theory is optimation method that can be use if only there are 




of action that can be made), and payoff (result of each decision for each player). 
The objective is to find best choice that consider all player with their strategy and 
payoff. Because game theory deals with interactive situation. 
 
2.3.1 Best Responses and Dominant Strategies 
For every possible strategy that the opponent might do, we asked what was 
our best strategy if the opponent played that strategy?. The best decision to answer 
that question is by finding the best response. Consider a game with N players. A 
best response for player N to the N−1 strategies of their opponent is a strategy that 
maximizes their payoff against these N −1 strategies of their opponents (Hermalin, 
1998).  
A single strategy for a player that is a best dominant strategy response to 
every strategy of their opponents (Hermalin, 1998). This means that no matter that 
their opponent do if a player got dominant strategies, they always pick that 
strategies. So the outcome of the game will be that dominant strategies. But in game 
theory dominant strategies also by considering all outcome that possibly be taken. 
 
2.3.2 Strategic Form Games 
Strategic form games is form of games that can be visualize by using table 
(cardinal) by assign each strategy from each player. This usually happen when each 
player make the decision simultaneously so payoff can be identify right away. 
Strategic form can be drawn as follows:  
 







2.3.3 Nash Equilibrium 
Strategies chosen by the players of a game constitute a Nash equilibrium 
when each player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies of the other players 
(Hermalin, 1998). In other words, when each player got to get one best response for 
every alternative it categorize as nash equilibrium. but, there are a unique Nash 
equilibrium that the solution concept yields a single prediction. Moreover, for many 
games in which it yields multiple solutions. 
Nash equilbria are strategy profiles at which a game can no longer change, 
that can be good outcomes for all, some, or none of the players (Schecter & Gintis, 
2016). Nash equilibrium happen when all player will stuck at same deicision. It 
consider as solution in game theory problem. Or can be called as stable solution to 
the game. 
 
2.3.4 The Bertrand Model of Competition 
Hermalin mention that there are one type of competition model known as 
Bertrand model of competition. This model help to analyze competitive for two or 
more competitive firm in the market. In Bertrand model firms compete over prices. 
Therefore, reaction function are expressed in prices, not quantities (Graham, 2013). 
 
2.3.4.1  Assumptions Underlying the Bertrand Model 
There are several assumption underlie Bertrand model of competition 
(Hermalin, 1998).  
 Firms produce a homogenous product. Means that the product made 
by any one firm is absolutely equivalent in the consumers’ minds. 
 Customers know the price being charged by each firm. 
 Customers incur no costs switching from one firm to another firm. 
 No cost advantages: Regardless of the units produced by one firm 
versus another, they each have precisely the same marginal cost for 
the next unit produced. 
 No capacity constraints: Each firm is capable of handling the entire 




 No future considerations: Firms do not consider possible future 
interactions among themselves. 
Customers know all prices and face no switching costs, customers will buy 
from the firm charging the lowest price. If more than one firm is charging the lowest 
price then it can assume that customers divide themselves equally, on average, 
among those firms charging this lowest price. 
 
2.3.4.2 Equilibrium in the Bertrand Model 
To solve Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game is by calculating each 
firm’s best response to various strategies of its rivals. The market price in a Nash 
equilibrium of the Bertrand model is equal to marginal cost (Hermalin, 1998). 
In profit term, All firms in a Bertrand industry must make zero economic 
profits (Hermalin, 1998). This means that if each firm keep competing they must 
face the fact that the price is keep lower and lower until it reach zero profit margin. 
Better approach should be done to analyze this problem further. This is why being 
in a Bertrand industry is undesirable and why we will refer to being in the Bertrand 
model as being in the Bertrand trap. 
 
 
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis plays a central role in structuring and analyzing 
decision models and often provides valuable insights for the decision maker 
(Clement & Reily, 2013). Sensitifity analysis is use by varying the input values, and 
determine the potential impact of each input variable in the mode. This method is 
used to overcome uncertainty by analyze each factor that might be change the 
optimum decision is each variable is change. In this change is used to analyze how 
change of the price can affect firms market share. 
In practical engineering systems and mathematical models, uncertainties 
are often encountered in the input factors, which will lead to uncertain performance. 
Sensitivity analysis has been widely used to help decision makers understand the 






2.5 What-if Analysis 
What-If Analysis is the process of changing the variable values in formula 
to see how those changes will affect the outcome of formula. This analysis tools is 
came up at MS. Excel. It’s use to analyze how some variable affect its optimum 
value by changing its value. It similar with sensitifity analysis. The use of what-if 
analysis it’s a way for a company, individual, or economist, to plug in different 
scenarios and values to determine a range of possible outcomes. 
MS.Excel is one tool that can help to do what-if analysis. There are three 
kinds of What-If Analysis tools come with MS. Excel: Scenarios, Goal Seek, and 
Data Tables. Scenarios and Data tables take sets of input values and determine 
possible results. 
 
2.6 Previous Research 
There are several research that similar with this research that can be 
reference to conduct this research. below is the list of the similar research and it’s 
brief explanation. Previous research help to give better understanding to the case, 
solution, and metholodgy in solve similar problem 
 
Table 2-1 Table list of previous Research 
No Author Research Title Description 






Perspektif PT. Y 
Sumatera 
Analyze the market share 
by using regression to 
forecast future market 
share, regression also to 
identify relation between 
each variable 
2 Dwika Puspa 
Wardhani (2017) 
 
Analisis Market Share 
Semen Gresik Varian 
Bag Dengan 
Menggunakan Log 
Analyze future market 
share of semen gresik by 
using regression and use 








determine market share and 
considering time, 
competitor historical data. 
3 Adelia Stephanie 
Zarlinda (2015) 
Comparison Analysis 
of Pricing Behaviour 
of Garuda Airlines 
Ticket Prices 
Between Peak and 
Non-Peak Departure 
time by days of 
Purchase 
Study airlines pricing 
behavior in peak and non 
peak departure time using 
descriptive analysis to 
compare the behavior and 
using multiple regression to 
see mathematical relation 
between price change over 
time in different condition 






Berbasi Waktu dan 
Persediaan Kursi 
untuk Penerbangan 
Paralel pada Low 




Focus on model 
development based on 
dynamic pricing in defining 
seat price using numeric 
experiment 
 
To analyze this research and it’s contribution it can be describe by defining 
research position compare to previous research. Below is table to to describe this 





Table 2-2 Research Position 
No Topic 
Research 
Vena Wardhani Zarlinda Purwantini 
This 
Research 
1 Pricing Behaviour √   √ √ √ 
2 
Relation between 
Pricing to Market 
Share 
√ √     √ 
3 
Consider Time Frame 
in Pricing Strategies 


















1 Regression √ √ √   √ 
2 Game Theory       √ √ 
3 Numerical Experiment       √   
4 Descriptive Analysis     √     
5 Sensitivity Analysis √ √     √ 
 
 This research try to create profiling pricing competition behavior in 
oligopoly market, previous research able to solve many research regarding pricing 
competition in two different object and different method. But not all research is 
focus on studying pricing behavior, the idea that different with other research this 
research try to test paradigm about lowring price to keep demand. What the best 











3. CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 This chapter will explain about procedure to do this research.This chapter 
also explain and show data collection process and mathematical model formulation 
that used in strategic form table formulation and to determine future output or 
forecast from each player. 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
This research is done in some straight procedure that has been planned 
before. all this research procedure is done in some methodology. This would help 
author to do this research systematically. Below is the research methodology drawn 













Developing Model to Forecast Relation Between 











Valid? Model Accuracy 
Test
 








Result Interpretation and Analysis
Conclusion and Suggestion
End
2 Player or more




Figure 3.2 Research methodology Flowchart (Con’t) 
 
The following will explain each of the stages of this research, Literature 
Review, Data Collection, Model Development, Developing Scenario, Result 
interpretation and analysis, as well as conclusions and suggestions. 
 
3.1.1 Literature Review 
This section will explain about previous study in pricing competition in 
oligopoly market to give better understanding how previous research has been done. 
Also, to identify what factor that can affect the problem. After the present condition 
is known, problems and research objectives will be detemined. The problem 
formulated in this research is study competition behavior in pricing strategy at 
oligopoly market by using cement industry as case study. 
The problem here is what happen if we lose some market share but can 





decision to respond price change. This research tries to identify solution and study 
behavior in pricing competition. 
Literature review is used as a basis and reference in this research. Every 
related knowledge regarded to research is studied such as game theory, market share, 
regression, and sensitivity analysis. Better understanding about this term can give 
better insight to this research.. Literature Review are obtained from a various 
sources, such as books or journals.  
Literature review is also used to identify best tools and how to formulate 
the solution to enhance the understanding to the problem and the tools, by 
understand previous reseach and result 
 
3.1.2 Data Collection 
. Data collection is done by obtaining sales and price information from 
cement with bag packaging in some region from all sellers in that region. The data 
is set monthly. 
 
3.1.3 Model Development 
After data is collected, regression model is created to determine volume 
based on its price, competitor price, and monthly trend. Then, for each month, table 
payoff is created by assign predicted value using what-if and sensitivity analysis  
scenario in each cells. After each scenario is formulated, the best solution for each 
month is determine by using game theory 
 
3.1.4 Developing Scenario 
After all payoff table formulation is done, next is to assign scenario based 
on cement industry data. Variable that change in the scenario is pricing strategies 
and number of player. All scenario is design in long term period.  
 
3.1.5 Scenario Development and Analysis 
On this stage, result interpretation and analysis will be conducted from 
previous stage. After each best strategy in each month defined, next stage is to 




high, keep low or keep high, or other possible scenario. Then, the result is compare 
and accumulated. After that, all of the result is gathered to get better understanding 
in pricing strategy.  
 
3.1.6 Conclusion and Suggestion 
Final stage of this research will be conclusion from the result and 
suggestion for future research. 
 
3.2 Conceptual Model 
The process of this research follows designated conceptual model. 
Conceptual model is a type of model or diagram which shows relation and 
integration between factor or process. Conceptual model tells in system oerspective. 
Which means that in this part, the research try to explain in input-process-output-
analysis-conclusion scheme. These scheme helps author to develop report show 
data is used. Below is the conceptual model. 
 
 





This research start by formulating payoff using regression model that has 
been developed by Wardhani (2017). But before after payoff table formulation, the 
regression model is tests the accuracy level to forecast the output. Then it continue 
by doing scenario testing and behavior analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3.3 Data Collection 
Data Collected in this research is data that gathered in market survey by 
Wardhani (2017) and Vena (2017). The market survey is done by gathered sales 
volume of each cement company in each region related to their prices. 
 
3.4 Regression Model  
Regression model is used as mathematical formulation to get related 
outcome. This regression model used linear regression to all data for two player and 
multiplayer where volume is identified as response and the other data categorize as 
predictors. This regression model is the model that has been developed by Wardhani 
(2017) and Vena (2017). But, in the process, the authors do some improvement to 
get better result.  
3.4.1.1 Wardhani (2017) and Vena (2017) Model  
First initial regression model that already developed by Wardhani (2017) 
and Vena (2017). But there are slightly improvement in period identifier. That 
already shown in data arrangement. Second is model that developed by author that 
separate price variable to each player so that any change from 1 player could change 
the result. 
This regression model is done by various confidence level to compare the 
result before it’s continue. But in all confidence level the result is the same. All 
shows the similar result regardless the number of the confidence level. 
These regression model is based on data arrangement that been showed in 
figure 4.2.3. but there are some improvement from these model which is the period 
that previously written 1-2-3… regardless the period. But in the improvement the 
period written based on the period. Means that in January 2014 the period will be 




In general this model can be written as  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼 . 𝑃𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑀𝑡
12
𝑡=1
+ 𝛽 .  𝐵𝑘 + 𝛾 . 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 
 
Where : 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  = Sales Volume at Month t in Period i 
𝛼  = Price Coefficient 
𝑃𝑖  = Price Setting in period i 
𝑀𝑡  = Monthly Coefficient 
𝛽  = Brand Coefficient 
𝐵𝑘  = Brand Identifier player k 
𝛾  = Period Coefficient 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 = Period Series i Identifier 
 
As the formula above describe how each variable from sales volume to 
their respected period time relate to their prices. Below is the result of calculation 
from sales volume regression model in Aceh region with two player (SAI and SP) 
 
Volume = 101811 - 0.0746 Price + 202.8 Period - 12346 M1 - 17237 M2 - 15576 M3 - 18279 M4 
         - 12658 M5 - 10777 M6 - 20557 M7 - 3475 M8 - 7077 M9 - 4860 M10 + 841 M11 
         + 24504 SAI 
 
At the result there are inctercept that can be negletted by zero coefficient 
in regression menu. The result is similar. So Semen Padang sales volume if the price 
is Rp 900.000,- at 33 period from the first data, at January would be 29017.4 Kg. 
This calculation used as predictor method to formulated the outcome based on price 
input. 
 
3.4.1.2 Interactive Regression Model 
To improve the model so that if the competitor change their price the other 





Authors try to develop model that can accommodate these problem through 
regression model. To do it data arrangement is slightly change by create new 
variable which is each player price in each data arrangement. Below is data 
arrangement for interactive regression model.  
 
Table 3-1 Data Arrangement for Interactive Regression Model 
 
From this data arrangement there new variable that will affect the result of 
other player sales volume of theres price change from other player. These model 
can accommodate the sensitivity analysis and appropriate for zero-sum game. 
because any change could change all sales volume outcome. 
In general this model can be written as  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =   ∑ 𝛼 . 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1
+  ∑ 𝑀𝑡
12
𝑡=1
+ 𝛽 .  𝐵𝑘 + 𝛾 . 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 
 
Where : 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  = Sales Volume at Month t in Period i 
𝛼  = Price Coefficient 
𝑃𝑖𝑘  = Price Setting for player k in period i 
𝑀𝑡  = Monthly Coefficient 
Month Brand Volume Price SAI Price SP Period M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 SAI SP
Jan-14 SAI 53,601 892,226 865,976 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 20,308 892,226 865,976 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Feb-14 SAI 51,935 891,291 865,041 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 18,718 891,291 865,041 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mar-14 SAI 51,533 896,417 870,167 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 21,605 896,417 870,167 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Apr-14 SAI 44,096 909,487 883,237 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 17,620 909,487 883,237 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
May-14 SAI 55,497 920,574 894,324 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 23,938 920,574 894,324 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jun-14 SAI 56,770 922,474 896,224 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 27,590 922,474 896,224 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jul-14 SAI 44,612 925,647 899,397 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 18,571 925,647 899,397 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Aug-14 SAI 55,881 928,081 901,831 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
SP 28,471 928,081 901,831 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sep-14 SAI 57,753 952,743 926,493 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
SP 38,836 952,743 926,493 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Oct-14 SAI 43,907 929,670 903,420 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
SP 30,323 929,670 903,420 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Nov-14 SAI 56,042 954,515 928,265 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
SP 33,559 954,515 928,265 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Dec-14 SAI 54,556 1,004,633 978,383 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0





𝛽  = Brand Coefficient 
𝐵𝑘  = Brand Identifier for Player k 
𝛾  = Period Coefficient 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 = Period Series i Identifier 
 
The idea of interactive model is from the regression the price will directly 
affect the result for all player. Because the sales volume is affected by every player 
in the region.  
3.5 Model Accuracy Test 
After each regression model already been developed, to understand how 
good the model to be used for this research, the next step is to test how well this 
mathematical model can predict and forecast future outcome. The data that used for 
regression is cut to n-6 or n-3, then for each period the regression result is compare 
with the actual result. 
This model accuracy testing is used also as validation effort towards this 
model. Because it’s never been implemented to real system the result only 
compared to their result on it’s actual period. 
The model fit test is done by comparing result of regression and actual 
value. First regression is done to n-6 data, then the formula used to forecast outcome 
in n-5 period from all data gathered. Then for n-5 data the procedure is repeat so 
the regression is updated every period to forecast the next outcome. These means 
to forecast n-t period data, n-t-1 data is used. Next, the result compared with the 
actual outcome. Comparing process is done by calculate the error between actual 
outcome and regression result 
 
3.5.1 Wardhani (2017) and Vena (2017)Model Accuracy Test 





Table 3-2 Model Fit Test for Wardhani (2017) and Vena (2017) Model in Aceh 
Region 
 
From the result, it can be seen that the Mean Percentage Error (MPE) Is 
4.39 %. And for Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) the error is 8.48 %. 
These result indicates 90-95 % accuracy from these regression model.  
In multiplayers perspective the model fit test done for Kalimantan Selatan 
Region. In Kalimantan selatan region there are 5 player. But because the error for 
Holcim Indonesia and Semen Tonasa is quite high these two player is removed for 
the calculation. Below is the calculation of model fit test for multi player.  
 
Table 3-3 Model Fit Test for Wardhani (2017) and Vena (2017) Model in 
Kalimantan Selatan Region 
 
Volume Market Share Revenue Share PE APE Market Share Revenue Share
Mar-16 SAI 48,889          65.88% 66.55% 0.54% 0.54% 64.55% 65.23%
SP 25,316          34.12% 33.45% 6.20% 6.20% 35.45% 34.77%
Apr-16 SAI 48,875          65.77% 66.44% -3.27% 3.27% 61.78% 62.48%
SP 25,438          34.23% 33.56% 13.14% 13.14% 38.22% 37.52%
May-16 SAI 55,656          63.23% 63.92% -3.98% 3.98% 60.49% 61.20%
SP 32,365          36.77% 36.08% 7.41% 7.41% 39.51% 38.80%
Jun-16 SAI 56,769          62.67% 63.37% -3.78% 3.78% 57.77% 58.50%
SP 33,820          37.33% 36.63% 15.44% 15.44% 42.23% 41.50%
Jul-16 SAI 47,422          65.71% 66.40% -6.41% 6.41% 60.29% 61.02%
SP 24,741          34.29% 33.60% 15.71% 15.71% 39.71% 38.98%
Aug-16 SAI 66,172          60.19% 60.92% 6.77% 6.77% 55.39% 56.14%
SP 43,760          39.81% 39.08% 23.44% 23.44% 44.61% 43.86%
Sep-16 SAI 63,621          60.60% 61.32% -11.15% 11.15% 57.70% 58.44%
SP 41,364          39.40% 38.68% 1.42% 1.42% 42.30% 41.56%
Mean 4.39% 8.48%
Actual
Period Brand Volume Market Share Revenue Share PE APE Market Share Revenue Share
Jul-16 ITP 16,506         39.20% 41.37% -6.03% 6.03% 26.4% 27.18%
HI (2,444)         -5.80% -6.49% 197.75% 197.75% 4.2% 4.63%
SG 6,186           14.69% 16.44% 28.69% 28.69% 14.7% 16.06%
CCI 23,183         55.06% 52.30% 16.80% 16.80% 47.2% 43.79%
ST (1,326)         -3.15% -3.62% 130.23% 130.23% 7.4% 8.34%
Aug-16 ITP 22801 30.65% 31.29% 21.28% 21.28% 35.3% 36.02%
HI 4011 5.39% 5.83% -16.87% 16.87% 4.2% 4.52%
SG 12506 16.81% 18.19% -11.35% 11.35% 13.7% 14.80%
CCI 30060 40.41% 37.13% 6.39% 6.39% 39.1% 35.94%
ST 5006 6.73% 7.56% 21.38% 21.38% 7.8% 8.71%
Sep-16 ITP 25236.6671 29.24% 29.76% 7.53% 7.53% 29.1% 29.87%
HI 6196.1871 7.18% 7.75% -100.14% 100.14% 3.3% 3.59%
SG 14643.1871 16.97% 18.30% 8.46% 8.46% 17.1% 18.56%
CCI 32525.8004 37.68% 34.52% 18.41% 18.41% 42.5% 39.27%






3.5.2 Interactive Regression Model 
But, the decision to use these model is based on how good these model can 
forecast the outcome in practical or in actual condition. Therefore, the model fit test 
for these model is needed. Below is the result of model fit test from the interactive 
regression model. 
Table 3-4 Model Fit Test for Interactive Regression Model 
 
From the result it can be identified that Mean Percentage Error (MPE) for 
this model is 4.66% and Mean Absolute Percentage Error is 8.68%. this is slightly 
higher from the previous model. Also because the current result can be affected by 
changing the value this regression model is too sensitive to be used. Therefore 
model that used is initial model that already been developed by Wardhani (2017) 
and Vena (2017). 
3.6 Payoff Model Formulation 
After data arranged, to formulate payoff table in the market regression 
model fit test apply. Regression used is linear regression. By using sales volume as 
response and other factor as predictor. To detect trend, data is separated by 
categorical data from M1-M12. It’s similar with brand. Below is the example of 
aceh regression result from Januari 2014 to March 2016 using MS. Excel. 
 
Volume SP Market Share Revenue Share PE APE Market Share Revenue Share
Mar-16 SAI 48,815          0 66.05% 66.72% 0.69% 0.69% 64.55% 65.23%
SP 25,086          33.95% 33.28% 7.05% 7.05% 35.45% 34.77%
Apr-16 SAI 48,816          0 65.87% 66.54% -3.14% 3.14% 61.78% 62.48%
SP 25,290          34.13% 33.46% 13.64% 13.64% 38.22% 37.52%
May-16 SAI 55,647          0 63.28% 63.97% -3.97% 3.97% 60.49% 61.20%
SP 32,292          36.72% 36.03% 7.62% 7.62% 39.51% 38.80%
Jun-16 SAI 56,729          0 62.76% 63.46% -3.71% 3.71% 57.77% 58.50%
SP 33,662          37.24% 36.54% 15.83% 15.83% 42.23% 41.50%
Jul-16 SAI 47,348          0 65.87% 66.55% -6.24% 6.24% 60.29% 61.02%
SP 24,534          34.13% 33.45% 16.41% 16.41% 39.71% 38.98%
Aug-16 SAI 66,137          0 60.27% 60.99% 6.81% 6.81% 55.39% 56.14%
SP 43,604          39.73% 39.01% 23.71% 23.71% 44.61% 43.86%
Sep-16 SAI 63,583          0 60.64% 61.36% -11.08% 11.08% 57.70% 58.44%







Figure 3.4 Aceh Data Regression Result 
For data that have more than 16 variable regression process is not using 
Ms. Escel but using Minitab. Below is the screenshot and result of regression in 
Kepulauan Riau Area  
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.942157339
R Square 0.887660451




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 16 10073862816 629616426 22.01155721 3.60975E-14
Residual 39 1274916776 32690173.74
Total 55 11348779592
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 83229.5019 36926.75214 2.253907996 0.029896668 8538.09564 157920.9082 8538.09564 157920.9082
Price -0.076487182 0.042002473 -1.821016162 0.076282775 -0.161445202 0.008470839 -0.161445202 0.008470839
Period 315.6855341 114.9888459 2.74535788 0.009093974 83.09863968 548.2724286 83.09863968 548.2724286
M1 8383.655829 3771.026216 2.223176226 0.03206865 756.0353431 16011.27631 756.0353431 16011.27631
M2 3567.153649 3713.283212 0.960646804 0.342648142 -3943.670588 11077.97789 -3943.670588 11077.97789
M3 5328.185984 3741.016163 1.424261685 0.162323539 -2238.733441 12895.10541 -2238.733441 12895.10541
M4 2045.54622 4077.26773 0.50169534 0.618702401 -6201.506196 10292.59864 -6201.506196 10292.59864
M5 8191.745557 4094.601242 2.00062108 0.052429196 -90.36719551 16473.85831 -90.36719551 16473.85831
M6 9151.647635 4052.972097 2.25800904 0.029616982 953.7377758 17349.55749 953.7377758 17349.55749
M7 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
M8 12633.58828 4045.683035 3.122733089 #NUM! 4450.421942 20816.75462 4450.421942 20816.75462
M9 15269.57696 4077.191314 3.745121528 0.000581941 7022.679113 23516.47481 7022.679113 23516.47481
M10 16145.44255 4129.471071 3.909808852 0.000358265 7792.798909 24498.08619 7792.798909 24498.08619
M11 21958.82484 4253.181324 5.162917629 7.48077E-06 13355.95359 30561.69608 13355.95359 30561.69608
M12 21254.27281 4659.394877 4.561595093 4.94044E-05 11829.7571 30678.78852 11829.7571 30678.78852
SAI 25747.54218 1910.396418 13.47759132 2.93305E-16 21883.40069 29611.68367 21883.40069 29611.68367





Figure 3.5 Regression Result of Aceh region Data 
Then from regression model designated result (sales volume) can be 
identified if the price and the period is change and adjusted. This model can be used 
to calculate the output for the what if analysis and furthermore to formulated payoff 
table or strategic form.  
 
3.7 What if Analysis 
After payoff table has been developed, to find the solution is by using game 
theory. To do that, strategic form of game thery must be developed. To develop this 
model, the input is change and to get it’s related result. Then it’s done to 7 possible 




the price set for increasing and decreasing is change every 5% from it’s initial price 
set. 
 
3.7.1 Market Share Payoff Table 
Market share payoff table is build based on outcome from regression 
model. The sales outcome from each player with their designated price. the 
percentage of the shares is each player sales volume divided by the total sales 
volume from each player in their region. Below is the example of market share what 
if analysis analysis for April 2016 based on the regression model in aceh region.  
 
Table 3-5 Aceh Market Share Payoff Table for April 2016 
 
 
These table is zero-sum payoff table, which means player A gain is Player 
B loss. Based on the payoff table the result or the nash equilibrium for market share 
for each player is when each player lower their price to the lowest possible. From 
this result, known that if market share is important lowering price is the best strategy 




796,991.94      843,873.82 890,755.70         937,637.58   984,519.45     1,031,401.33  1,078,283.21  
773,551.00     37.60% 39.09% 40.70% 42.44% 44.34% 46.42% 48.71%
819,054.00     35.22% 36.66% 38.23% 39.94% 41.81% 43.87% 46.13%
864,557.00     32.64% 34.03% 35.55% 37.22% 39.04% 41.06% 43.29%
910,060.00     29.84% 31.18% 32.63% 34.23% 35.99% 37.95% 40.13%
955,563.00     26.81% 28.06% 29.43% 30.95% 32.63% 34.50% 36.59%
1,001,066.00  23.50% 24.65% 25.92% 27.32% 28.88% 30.64% 32.62%







Table 3-6 Region Kalimantan Selatan Market Share Payoff Table in September 
2016 Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Payoff. 
 
 
The result also similar for multiplayer, it can be seen that no matter what 
happen from other player. Lowering their price always gives the best result in 
market share perspective. In above table it shown that ITP gain more market share 
when they lowering their price. 
 
3.7.2 Revenue Share Payoff Table 
Revenue share is percentage share of revenue from each player in their 
region. Revenue share also based on sales volume and also affected by it’s price. 
Total revenue from each player is total sales volume times their related price set. 
Below is the example of revenue share payoff table from Aceh Region on April 
2016.  
Payoff ITP Lower ITP 706,765  706,765        706,765  743,963        743,963  743,963        781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601        828,031  749,171        788,601  828,031        749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171        636,088        751,737        28.2% 28.4% 28.6% 27.7% 27.9% 28.1% 27.1% 27.3% 27.6%
749,171        636,088        791,302        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.9% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.6% 27.8%
749,171        636,088        830,867        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
749,171        669,567        751,737        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.8% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.5% 27.7%
749,171        669,567        791,302        28.6% 28.8% 29.0% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 28.0%
749,171        669,567        830,867        28.8% 29.0% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
749,171        703,045        751,737        28.5% 28.8% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 27.9%
749,171        703,045        791,302        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 27.9% 28.2%
749,171        703,045        830,867        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        636,088        751,737        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.9% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.6% 27.8%
788,601        636,088        791,302        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
788,601        636,088        830,867        28.8% 29.1% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.8% 27.8% 28.0% 28.2%
788,601        669,567        751,737        28.6% 28.8% 29.0% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 28.0%
788,601        669,567        791,302        28.8% 29.0% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
788,601        669,567        830,867        29.0% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.7% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        703,045        751,737        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 27.9% 28.1%
788,601        703,045        791,302        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        703,045        830,867        29.2% 29.4% 29.7% 28.7% 28.9% 29.1% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%
828,031        636,088        751,737        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
828,031        636,088        791,302        28.8% 29.1% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.8% 27.8% 28.0% 28.2%
828,031        636,088        830,867        29.1% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.8% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
828,031        669,567        751,737        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
828,031        669,567        791,302        29.0% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.7% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
828,031        669,567        830,867        29.3% 29.5% 29.7% 28.7% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%
828,031        703,045        751,737        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.1% 28.4%
828,031        703,045        791,302        29.2% 29.4% 29.7% 28.7% 28.9% 29.1% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%




Table 3-7 Aceh Revenue Share Payoff Table for April 2016 
 
 
From the payoff table is known that the best solution or it’s nash 
equilibrium for each player is when they lowering they price. all of them will try 
lowering their price as low as possible if their goal is to gain revenue shares. These 
solution is similar with market share. But in total revenue the reslt is not the same. 
Optimum total revenue cant be reach by lowering price as low as possible. 
There are a point that become optimum value in some certain condition it can reach 
by lowering or increasing price. 
 
3.7.3 Profit Share Payoff Table 
Profit share is total percentage of profit gain from each player from total 
profit gained in their region. In calculating profit needed new variable to consider 
which is cost of good sold. Cost of good sold data is not available and hard to 
identify because it will related to each company and their factory location. 
Therefore cost of good sold is assume by several factor such as range to the market 
from their factory (logistic cost) and their estimates efficiency. Below is the payoff 
table for profit share in Aceh region on April 2016. 
REVENUE SHARE
1-Apr-16
33.56% 796,991.94 843,873.82 890,755.70 937,637.58     984,519.45 1,031,401.33 1,078,283.21  
773,551.00          36.91% 37.04% 37.34% 37.82% 38.50% 39.39% 40.52%
819,054.00          35.84% 35.97% 36.27% 36.75% 37.41% 38.29% 39.41%
864,557.00          34.45% 34.58% 34.87% 35.34% 36.00% 36.86% 37.97%
910,060.00          32.69% 32.82% 33.11% 33.56% 34.20% 35.05% 36.13%
955,563.00          30.52% 30.64% 30.91% 31.35% 31.97% 32.79% 33.84%
1,001,066.00       27.84% 27.96% 28.22% 28.64% 29.23% 30.01% 31.01%








Table 3-8 Aceh Profits Share Payoff Table for April 2016 
 
On contrary with market share and revenue share the best solution in profit 
share is by increasing their price. But, it happen not for all cases. In showed table 
above best proft shares gain for SP is in Rp, 1.001.066,-. When SP try to increase 
their price again, the result is not higher than their previour result. 
What if analysis also used in scenario testing outcome. To identified the 
best scenario, the result from regression model is compared with initial result to 
know wheter it’s good decision or not. From this also all competitive parameter is 
observe with their result. So behviour can be identified by using game theory to 





33.56% 796,991.94 843,873.82 890,755.70          937,637.58 984,519.45 1,031,401.33  1,078,283.21  
773,551.00     0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
819,054.00     16.41% 13.12% 11.22% 10.04% 9.28% 8.81% 8.56%
864,557.00     26.24% 21.48% 18.63% 16.81% 15.63% 14.90% 14.49%
910,060.00     32.02% 26.59% 23.27% 21.11% 19.70% 18.82% 18.33%
955,563.00     35.16% 29.43% 25.88% 23.55% 22.03% 21.06% 20.53%
1,001,066.00  36.28% 30.46% 26.82% 24.45% 22.88% 21.88% 21.34%







Table 3-9 Predictive Cummulative Total Profits Payoff Table in Kalimanan Selatan 
for September 2016 
 
 
For multiplayer also known that cumulative profits that can be gain is 
higher when all of them increase their price. these means that for every player, the 
possibility of their income will be higher for all situation when they together 












Lower ITP 706,765  706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963      743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161                   
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601      828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031                   
749,171  636,088  751,737  8,054      8,297      8,484      8,958      9,202          9,389      9,812      10,056    10,242                      
749,171  636,088  791,302  8,323      8,567      8,753      9,228      9,472          9,658      10,082    10,326    10,512                      
749,171  636,088  830,867  8,535      8,779      8,966      9,440      9,684          9,870      10,294    10,538    10,724                      
749,171  669,567  751,737  9,157      9,401      9,587      10,062    10,305        10,492    10,916    11,159    11,346                      
749,171  669,567  791,302  9,427      9,670      9,857      10,331    10,575        10,762    11,185    11,429    11,615                      
749,171  669,567  830,867  9,639      9,882      10,069    10,544    10,787        10,974    11,397    11,641    11,828                      
749,171  703,045  751,737  10,219    10,463    10,649    11,124    11,367        11,554    11,978    12,221    12,408                      
749,171  703,045  791,302  10,489    10,732    10,919    11,394    11,637        11,824    12,247    12,491    12,677                      
749,171  703,045  830,867  10,701    10,945    11,131    11,606    11,849        12,036    12,460    12,703    12,890                      
788,601  636,088  751,737  8,635      8,879      9,065      9,540      9,784          9,970      10,394    10,638    10,824                      
788,601  636,088  791,302  8,905      9,149      9,335      9,810      10,053        10,240    10,664    10,907    11,094                      
788,601  636,088  830,867  9,117      9,361      9,547      10,022    10,265        10,452    10,876    11,119    11,306                      
788,601  669,567  751,737  9,739      9,982      10,169    10,643    10,887        11,073    11,497    11,741    11,927                      
788,601  669,567  791,302  10,008    10,252    10,438    10,913    11,157 11,343    11,767    12,011    12,197                      
788,601  669,567  830,867  10,220    10,464    10,650    11,125    11,369        11,555    11,979    12,223    12,409                      
788,601  703,045  751,737  10,801    11,044    11,231    11,705    11,949        12,135    12,559    12,803    12,989                      
788,601  703,045  791,302  11,070    11,314    11,500    11,975    12,219        12,405    12,829    13,073    13,259                      
788,601  703,045  830,867  11,282    11,526    11,712    12,187    12,431        12,617    13,041    13,285    13,471                      
828,031  636,088  751,737  9,160      9,403      9,590      10,064    10,308        10,494    10,918    11,162    11,348                      
828,031  636,088  791,302  9,429      9,673      9,859      10,334    10,578        10,764    11,188    11,432    11,618                      
828,031  636,088  830,867  9,641      9,885      10,071    10,546    10,790        10,976    11,400    11,644    11,830                      
828,031  669,567  751,737  10,263    10,507    10,693    11,168    11,411        11,598    12,022    12,265    12,452                      
828,031  669,567  791,302  10,533    10,776    10,963    11,437    11,681        11,867    12,291    12,535    12,721                      
828,031  669,567  830,867  10,745    10,988    11,175    11,649    11,893        12,080    12,503    12,747    12,933                      
828,031  703,045  751,737  11,325    11,569    11,755    12,230    12,473        12,660    13,084    13,327    13,514                      
828,031  703,045  791,302  11,595    11,838    12,025    12,499    12,743        12,930    13,353    13,597    13,783                      






































4. CHAPTER IV 
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR  ANALYSIS 
In this chapter will be explain about the scenario that apply in each price 
strategies and the result tof each test and model. 
 
4.1 Behavior Analysis 
Behavior analysis is done to study each competitive parameter. This is 
done by formulating each parameter and change price of each brand to identified 
the outcome. This also done by observing several case and test and look if there 
tendency in each case so it can be identified as behavior. To study this, each 
parameter observe what happen to them by changing the price set for each player. 
The price set is change in every 5%. Then, the solution will be identified using game 
theory principle. Below is the result from each parameter.  
 
4.1.1 Market Share 
Market share parameter change consistently as the price change. The change 
is moving in straight line. Lower price gives higher market share while higher price 
gives lower market share. Its market share getting higher when their competitor 
offer higher price. The best outcome that can be gain by each player is when they 
decrease their price as low as possible and other competitor increase their price as 
high as possible. These phenomenon accommodate in regression formula. The logic 
is when theres cheaper product and while other is more expensive, customer will 
change their buying decision to product who has lower price. Means that lowering 
price will give best outcome for market share. This is happen for all cases in all 
region that tested. 
In comparison, market share known to be more sensitive than revenue share. 
Because, each price change decision do not give equal change for revenue share 
and market share. It means that eventhough company could lose market share, 






4.1.2 Revenue and Revenue Share 
Similar with market share, in consistency and tendency revenue and 
market have similar behavior. When one player decrease their price, they also gain 
sales volume which leads to market share and revenue share. This is tested for all 
region and cases.  
 The change occur in revenue share is lower than in market share.  It can be 
concluded that market share is more sensitive towards price change rather than 
revenue share.  
From all table also it has been identified that lowering their price also the 
best option in revenue share perspective. Eventhough the revenue is high, but it’s 
only covered up as production cost with no profit.  
But, it is also found that eventhough revenue share could increase, in total 
number of revenue the revenue movement is not move in straight line. optimum 
revenue that can be gain based on regression formula has one optimum value. 
Because when price is too high, demands will also too low. It also happen when 
price is too low, the demand will go higher. But in revenue perspective, renevue 
graph form a single peak over the centre.  
 
 




















4.1.3 Profit and Profit Share 
On contrary with market share and revenue share, profit will increase as 
price is increase. But if it’s too low, profit will go down to 0 or even minus because 
the production cost is higher then product cost. If the price is too high, each 
company will not get any demand which leads too loss sales and cause high loss 
too. Below is payoff table that shows these phenomenon. 
Table 4-1 Payoff Table for Semen Padang of Profit in Aceh Region for April 2016 
Payoff SP (In Millions) 
  
  SAI 
  796,992  843,874  890,756  937,638 
                  
984,519  
            
1,031,401  
           
1,078,283  
SP 
       
773,551  
                          
(52) 
                         
(52) 
                      
(52) 
                               
(52) 
           
(52) 
                    
(52) 
                      
(52) 
       
819,054  
                      
1,432  
                      
1,432  
                     
1,432  
                                
1,432  
          
1,432  
                     
1,432  
                   
1,432  
       
864,557  
                      
2,595  
                      
2,595  
                     
2,595  
                                
2,595  
          
2,595  
                     
2,595  
                   
2,595  
       
910,060  
                      
3,436  
                      
3,436  
                     
3,436  
                   
3,436  
                       
3,436  
                     
3,436  
                   
3,436  
       
955,563  
                      
3,955  
                      
3,955  
                     
3,955  
                                
3,955  
          
3,955  
                     
3,955  
                   
3,955  
   
1,001,066  
                      
4,153  
                      
4,153  
                     
4,153  
                                
4,153  
          
4,153  
                     
4,153  
                   
4,153  
   
1,046,569  
                      
4,030  
                      
4,030  
                     
4,030  
                                
4,030  
          
4,030  
                     
4,030  
                   
4,030  
 
Almost every payoff table shows the same result. The most profitable price 
setting is not the highest. Best scenario in profit perspective is all player cooperating 
to increase their price. But, optimum profit that able to be gain by each player is not 
infinite as price increasing. It has optimum point when the profits will not increasing 
again. 
Optimum profits not always goes same direction as increasing price. 
Interesting finding from profits parameter is the optimum profit value can be gain 
by finding the best combination between price and demand in certain regression 
model. In table 5.15 can be seen that the optimum value is when the price is Rp. 
1,000,066 per tons. If it got higher than that, the profits will start decreasing. This 
is because the demand is so low even if the company get high profts, their demand 




To study more about these phenomenon, authors try to look all the price 
change in graph in all price range. Below is the graph that show price change and 
it’s profits for SP in aceh region for april 2016. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Profit Growth Graph 
 
These graph shown that there are optimum profit value for price and 
demand combination. Means that if price and demand goes the same way as the 
regression variable (price, period, and brand) the best decision is to find best price 
which optimize profits. If its too low company will get loss or no profits and if too 
high company will not get any demand because it’s too expensive. There are 
optimum point between these thing that can be consider in pricing strategies. 
 
4.2 Scenario Testing 
Scenario testing is done by testing three scenario for each case. These 
scenarios are based on how each player response for price change. Main goal for 
these scenario is to study about pricing strategies towards competitiveness 
parameter such market share, revenue, or profits. Below is the scenario that being 
tested: 
1. To response competitor price change (lower) other player should 
follow the price change. 
2. Keep disparity of our price with our competitor (Increase or decrease 































































































































3. Price change doesn’t matter. Each player can ignored and apply 
another price strategy 
Each scenario is compared by seeing each parameter such as revenue, 
profit, market share, and revenue share to see how each parameter react to price 
change. These scenario is done in two player case then compared with multiplayer 
case. Below is the result of the scenario testing for each market leader, follower and 
new entrant. 
 
4.2.1 Market Leader Perspective 
Market leader is defined as a player or company that selling the largest 
amount of particular type of product in market. To identify market leader simply by 
identify who is dominate market by selling the largest quantity of product. As they 
supply larger number of product they have bigger brand awareness and influence 
toward the market. But, market leader will always protect their competitive level to 
sustain in business. And also to try gaining more than they already been.  
 
4.2.1.1 First Scenario Testing Result 
For the test market leader will try to respon competitor price change by 
designated scenario. The designated scenario is scenario that already been decide 
before. The first scenario is to response competitor price change (lower) other 
player should follow the price change. The other competitor will decrease their 
price from previous price setting and the market leader will try to follow the same 
price setting as response. Decreasing price rate is 5%. So the competitor will try to 
decrease their price 5% from previous price setting and market leader will make the 
same decision in this scenario. Below is the table that show calculation of all 
competitive parameter that shows the outcome from the first scenario. 
 
Table 4-2 Market Leader, First Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Decreasing 
Price) 
















SAI 921,683  64,167  61.3% 62.0% 59,142  76.6% 15,829  
SP 894,306  40,514  38.7% 38.0% 36,232  23.4% 4,834  
Oct-2016 
SAI 849,591  70,873  61.1% 61.1% 60,213  78.6% 12,374  
SP 849,591  45,125  38.9% 38.9% 38,338  21.4% 3,366  
 
The volume in September is volume outcome from regression formula. To 
give comparable decision that both outcome (September and October outcome) is 
come from regression formula. price and volume is in tons. The market leader is 
SAI meanwhile SP as the other competitor. These result is come from two player 
perspective in aceh region. 
On table above can be seen that number of volume for both company is 
increasing. It caused by monthly period effect when in October demand for all brand 
will increasing. But wo see wheter is good decision other factor must be evaluate. 
In market share perspective SAI as market leader lose 0.2% of their market 
share. It also happen in revenue share when SAI lose 0.9% of their market share. 
The losing share is quite small although it still loss. So in market share and revenue 
share perspective, this scenario is not good.  
As for profits, the total loss share is higher. SAI lose 2% of their profits 
share and also in their total share. The total loss profit caused by this scenario is the 
market leader lose 21.8% from their previous total profits. These indicates that this 
scenario is not good for market leader therefore it should not consider as pricing 
strategy in the future.  
On the otherhand, in increasing scenario the result is different. To respon 
competitor that increasing their price, by following to increase the price market 
leader seems to gain advantage in this scenario. Below is the result from this the 
first scenario in increasing price situation. 
 
Table 4-3 Market Leader, First Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Increasing 
Price) 












SAI 921,683  64,167  61.30% 62.01% 59,142  76.61% 15,829  
SP 894,306  40,514  38.70% 37.99% 36,232  23.39% 4,834  




SP 939,021  38,285  37.42% 37.42% 35,951  27.08% 6,280  
 
On increasing scenario. The result is different. Both company lose small 
amount of sales volume. But in total revenue, market share gain more revenue while 
the other company loss their revenue. Market leader also gain 1.28% of market 
share from previous period and 0.57% of revenue share. 
Interesting fact is that as market leader gain more profit from this scenario 
the profits share is dropping. It’s cause from higher profit gain from competitor. To 
both player in this scenario is gaining more profit. Therefore it’s can be say as win-
win solution for both player.  
 
 
4.2.1.2 Second Scenario Testing Result 
In second scenario whenever competitor lower their price, they’ll follow 
by decreasing in same rate. Below is the result of the second scenario when the 
competitor try to offer lower price. 
 
Table 4-4 Market Leader, Second Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Decreasing 
Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683 64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142 64.0% 15,829 
  SP 894,306 40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232 36.0% 8,885 
1-Oct SAI 875,599 68,884 60.4% 61.1% 60,314 63.7% 13,818 
  SP 849,591 45,125 39.6% 38.9% 38,338 36.3% 7,878 
 
Both player got better sales volume when they lower their price. But in 
market share perspective market leader loss their shares in this scenario. 
Eventhough total sales volume is increasing, competitor gain is higher than market 
leader. This also happen in revenue. Market leader loss their market share and 




This also happen in profits. Market leader lose their profits share and also 
their total profits. Competitor also lose their total profits. But market lose more than 
their competitor. 
 
Table 4-5  Market Leader, Second Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Increasing 
Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  64.0% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  36.0%  8,885  
1-Oct SAI 967,767  61,834 61.8% 62.5% 59,841  64.2%  18,103  
  SP 939,021  38,285 38.2% 37.5% 35,951  35.8% 10,108  
 
 As for increasing price scenario, both company lose their sales volume. But, 
it’s the only bad things in this scenario. As for other parameter, market leader gain 
more benefit than their competitor. This happen in all parameter. Which means 
increasing in same rate as competitor is good choice. 
 
4.2.1.3 Third Scenario Testing Result 
Third scenario testing is whenever competitor change their price, market 
leader try to offer same price setting regardless what their competitor do. Below is 
recapitulation table from this scenario testing. 
 
 
Table 4-6 Market Leader,Third Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Decreasing 
Price) 













SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0%  59,142  64.0% 15,829  
SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  36.0% 8,885  
1-Oct 
  
SAI 921,683  65,359  59.2% 61.1% 60,240  67.2% 16,123  





 In this scenario, in market share, sales volume, and revenue market leader 
suffered loss. There are quite significant loss in market share, but lower at revenue 
share. Gain in revenue and profits in this scenario not cause from the price decision 
but from monthly effect. as revenue and profit gain comes from increasing number 
of demand caused by change of period. As for the competitor in profit perspective, 
they also loss profits eventhough gain more sales. Good thins is in term of profit 
share, market leader can gain more than their competitor in this scenario. 
 
Table 4-7  Market Leader,Third Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Increasing 
Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  64.0% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  36.0% 8,885  
1-Oct SAI 921,683  65,359 63.1% 62.6% 60,240  61.5% 16,123  
  SP 939,021  38,285 36.9% 37.4% 35,951  38.5% 10,108  
 
 As for increasing price, the out come is similar the different is in their share. 
In market share and revenue share market leader gain more shares than competitor. 
This because when competitor increasing their price, their sales volume also 




4.2.2 Follower Perspective 
Follower defines in this study is competitor aside from market leader. 
Their sales volume in the market is not the highest and also not dominate the market. 
Below is the result for all scenario testing  
4.2.2.1 First Scenario Testing Result 
In first scenario, follower will ry to follow up market leader price setting 





Table 4-8 Follower, First Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Decreasing Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  76.6% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  23.4% 4,834  
1-Oct SAI 875,599  68,884  61.5% 61.5% 60,314  76.1% 13,818  
  SP 875,599  43,136  38.5% 38.5% 37,770  23.9% 4,339  
 
From the result it can be seen that both player gain more sales volume. But 
in follower perspective they lose more than market leader in this scenario/ as they 
lose more market share and revenue share. Eventhough total revenue for both player 
is increasing.  
Total profit for both player also decreasing. But for follower the profit 
share is increasing rather than previous period. Of course there will be monthly 
effect but in total volume the different is hogher than motnly effect factor. 
 
Table 4-9 Follower, First Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Increasing Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  76.6% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  23.4% 4,834  
1-Oct SAI 967,767  61,834  63.1% 63.1% 59,841  72.2% 18,103  
  SP 967,767  36,086  36.9% 36.9% 34,923  27.8% 6,956  
 
 As for increasing price scenario. Both player lose their sales volume. 
Follower also lose their market and revenue shares. On the other hand follower 
profits and profit share is also increasing. When both increasing their price. Both 
player got better result. 
 
4.2.2.2 Second Scenario Testing Result 
In second scenatio follower will try to follow market leader price change 
by keeping disparity of their price. The disparity here define in their rates which is 
5%. The result is similar with market share perspective because both increasing and 





4.2.2.3 Third Scenario Testing Result 
In this case, follower will try to ignore all price change that offer by market 
leader. Below is the result of calculation of this scenario. First is in decreasing their 
price. 
Table 4-10 Follower, Third Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Decreasing Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  76.6% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  23.4% 4,834  
1-Oct SAI 875,599  68,884  62.3% 61.8% 60,314  73.5% 13,818  
  SP 894,306  41,705  37.7% 38.2% 37,297  26.5% 4,976  
 
Both player gain more sales volume as they decreasing their price. This 
scenario doesn’t give more benefit in market shares. Eventhough their total sales 
volume is increasing. In total revenue follower gain more than previiour period, 
also in revenue shares. But, gain in revenue share is quite small, only 0.2%. 
Interesting part here is as market leader gain less profit than previous 
period on the other hand follower get opposite result. This gives follower added 
3.1% profits share than previous profit shares. There are possibility that it’s the 
effect of monthly effect. 
 
Table 4-11 Follower, Third Scenario Testing in Aceh Region (Increasing Price) 











1-Sep SAI 921,683  64,167 61.3% 62.0% 59,142  76.6% 15,829  
  SP 894,306  40,514 38.7% 38.0% 36,232  23.4% 4,834  
1-Oct SAI 967,767  61,834 59.7% 61.6% 59,841  78.4% 18,103  
  SP 894,306  41,705 40.3% 38.4% 37,297  21.6% 4,976  
  
As for increasing scenario,  market leader will lose their market share 
while follower gain more. It’s also apply in revenue shares. But both player gain 




Both player also gain more profits in the next period. But follower lose 
their shares in profits. Quite significant, follower lose 2.2% of their profits shares 
regardless their gain in total profits. This caused by market leader that increasing 
their price which also increasing their profit margin and end up gain higher profit 
gain than follower who just ignored the price change. 
 
4.2.3 New Entrant Perspective 
For new entrant perspective, the test is done in region that have new entrant 
in the market. This region is Kepulauan Riau and Kalimantan selatan. This region 
also used as multi player case testing. The new entrant here is CCI which is PT. 
Conch Cement Indonesia. In Kepualuan Riau, CCI succeded to become market 
leader by offer much lower price. In Kalimantan Selatan they also can gain more 
sales but not as market leader.  
The result is different for each case, as new entrant that able to become 
market leader the result is similar with market leader perspective. It’s also apply for 
new entrant when they penetrate market by offering lower price but not able to 
become market leader in the area. The scenario testing for new entrant for all 
scenario similar with follower testing if the new entrant become follower in that 






Table 4-12 Market Share Payoff Table for CCI in Kalimantan Selatan 
 
 
The table shows all possible movement for CCI in the next period. As 
market leader if CCI choose to increase their price, total maket share will lower 
than if they decreasing their price. As for follower means that if market leader 
increasing their price, they will gain more market share than previous period. If 1 
brand keeps offer lower price eventually customer will change their buying decision 










Payoff CCI lower ITP 706,765  706,765      706,765  743,963      743,963  743,963      781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601      828,031  749,171      788,601  828,031      749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171      636,088      751,737      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.5% 37.8%
749,171      636,088      791,302      37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.5% 37.8% 38.1%
749,171      636,088      830,867      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
749,171      669,567      751,737      36.3% 36.6% 36.9% 36.6% 36.9% 37.1% 36.8% 37.1% 37.4%
749,171      669,567      791,302      36.6% 36.9% 37.2% 36.9% 37.1% 37.4% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7%
749,171      669,567      830,867      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
749,171      703,045      751,737      35.9% 36.2% 36.5% 36.2% 36.4% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0%
749,171      703,045      791,302      36.2% 36.5% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3%
749,171      703,045      830,867      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
788,601      636,088      751,737      37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.5% 37.8% 38.1%
788,601      636,088      791,302      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
788,601      636,088      830,867      37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.1% 38.4% 38.7%
788,601      669,567      751,737      36.6% 36.9% 37.2% 36.9% 37.1% 37.4% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7%
788,601      669,567      791,302      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
788,601      669,567      830,867      37.2% 37.5% 37.8% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3%
788,601      703,045      751,737      36.2% 36.5% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3%
788,601      703,045      791,302      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
788,601      703,045      830,867      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9%
828,031      636,088      751,737      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
828,031      636,088      791,302      37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.1% 38.4% 38.7%
828,031      636,088      830,867      37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.2% 38.5% 38.8% 38.4% 38.7% 39.1%
828,031      669,567      751,737      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
828,031      669,567      791,302      37.2% 37.5% 37.8% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3%
828,031      669,567      830,867      37.5% 37.8% 38.1% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3% 38.0% 38.3% 38.6%
828,031      703,045      751,737      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
828,031      703,045      791,302      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9%





































5. CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
In this chapter will be explain conclusion of this research and suggestion 
for this research or for further research.  
5.1 Conclusion 
After conducting this research, the conclusion from all these research is :  
 Model Test Accuracy 
The accuracy of this model is good enough to forecast the outcome. 
 Behavior Analysis : 
1. Market Share more sensitive to price change compared to revenue 
share (more stable). 
2. All player will choose to lower their price to gain more Market Share 
or Revenue Share if it’s their considerable competitive parameter. 
3. Best solution by consider revenue as parameter is similar with market 
share and revenue share which lowering price. 
4. Market Share and Revenue Share does not change similiarly with 
profts share. In profit share increasing price is the best solution. 
5. Optimum Profit value for each player is not infinite, depends on 
optimum combination of price and demand.  
6. Best solution to gain more profits is by cooperating to increase their 
price. 
 Scenario Testing 
1. Best Scenario to increase prof is all player cooperate to increase their 
price. 
2. All scenario that develop in these result doesn’t matter because it’s not 
the appropriate factor that need to be consider as pricing strategies. 
Instead of the best combination between price and the sales volume 
formula. so all scenario can be good or not depend on it’s demand 







Suggestion for future research regarding about the pricing behavior. 
1. To get better result in scenario testing, the research should continue 
and take to practical. means that each scenario needs to be 
implemented in real pricing strategies situation and compared to get 
the best conclusion.  
2. To get better result in this research, this case should be tested in 
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Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.942157339
R Square 0.887660451




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 16 10073862816 629616426 22.01155721 3.60975E-14
Residual 39 1274916776 32690173.74
Total 55 11348779592
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 83229.5019 36926.75214 2.253907996 0.029896668 8538.09564 157920.9082 8538.09564 157920.9082
Price -0.076487182 0.042002473 -1.821016162 0.076282775 -0.161445202 0.008470839 -0.161445202 0.008470839
Period 315.6855341 114.9888459 2.74535788 0.009093974 83.09863968 548.2724286 83.09863968 548.2724286
M1 8383.655829 3771.026216 2.223176226 0.03206865 756.0353431 16011.27631 756.0353431 16011.27631
M2 3567.153649 3713.283212 0.960646804 0.342648142 -3943.670588 11077.97789 -3943.670588 11077.97789
M3 5328.185984 3741.016163 1.424261685 0.162323539 -2238.733441 12895.10541 -2238.733441 12895.10541
M4 2045.54622 4077.26773 0.50169534 0.618702401 -6201.506196 10292.59864 -6201.506196 10292.59864
M5 8191.745557 4094.601242 2.00062108 0.052429196 -90.36719551 16473.85831 -90.36719551 16473.85831
M6 9151.647635 4052.972097 2.25800904 0.029616982 953.7377758 17349.55749 953.7377758 17349.55749
M7 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
M8 12633.58828 4045.683035 3.122733089 #NUM! 4450.421942 20816.75462 4450.421942 20816.75462
M9 15269.57696 4077.191314 3.745121528 0.000581941 7022.679113 23516.47481 7022.679113 23516.47481
M10 16145.44255 4129.471071 3.909808852 0.000358265 7792.798909 24498.08619 7792.798909 24498.08619
M11 21958.82484 4253.181324 5.162917629 7.48077E-06 13355.95359 30561.69608 13355.95359 30561.69608
M12 21254.27281 4659.394877 4.561595093 4.94044E-05 11829.7571 30678.78852 11829.7571 30678.78852
SAI 25747.54218 1910.396418 13.47759132 2.93305E-16 21883.40069 29611.68367 21883.40069 29611.68367









January 2014 – May 2016 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.942120049
R Square 0.887590187




df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 1.02E+10 6.39E+08 23.12406 4.93E-15













Intercept 84169.78183 36244.3 2.32229 0.025261 10972.94 157366.6 10972.94 157366.6
Price -0.0776502 0.041197 -1.88486 0.06655 -0.16085 0.005548 -0.16085 0.005548
Period 330.7455554 106.0304 3.119347 0.003312 116.6129 544.8782 116.6129 544.8782
M1 8405.099079 3705.825 2.268078 0.028659 921.0344 15889.16 921.0344 15889.16
M2 3564.416426 3649.37 0.976721 0.334435 -3805.64 10934.47 -3805.64 10934.47
M3 5316.717498 3676.463 1.44615 0.155737 -2108.05 12741.48 -2108.05 12741.48
M4 2673.854168 3652.124 0.732137 0.46825 -4701.76 10049.47 -4701.76 10049.47
M5 8236.156767 4022.635 2.047453 0.047057 112.2804 16360.03 112.2804 16360.03
M6 9172.709412 3982.886 2.303031 0.026424 1129.108 17216.31 1129.108 17216.31
M7 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
M8 12622.87737 3975.961 3.174799 #NUM! 4593.262 20652.49 4593.262 20652.49
M9 15255.60426 4006.814 3.807415 0.000461 7163.68 23347.53 7163.68 23347.53
M10 16125.971 4057.973 3.973898 0.00028 7930.728 24321.21 7930.728 24321.21
M11 21938.73563 4179.461 5.249178 5.02E-06 13498.14 30379.33 13498.14 30379.33
M12 21248.27056 4579.023 4.64035 3.54E-05 12000.75 30495.8 12000.75 30495.8
SAI 25578.44819 1854.892 13.78973 5.43E-17 21832.42 29324.48 21832.42 29324.48


























df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 10419741662 6.51E+08 24.49919 5.48E-16













Intercept 106081.4841 37235.69256 2.848919 0.006706 30988.55 181174.4 30988.55 181174.4
Price -0.078318764 0.039757827 -1.9699 0.055313 -0.1585 0.001861 -0.1585 0.001861
Period 333.8778108 96.49612035 3.460013 0.001232 139.2748 528.4808 139.2748 528.4808
M1 -12855.01956 3864.437193 -3.32649 0.001808 -20648.4 -5061.64 -20648.4 -5061.64
M2 -17704.07738 3999.684092 -4.42637 6.46E-05 -25770.2 -9637.95 -25770.2 -9637.95
M3 -15951.27046 3916.291383 -4.07306 0.000196 -23849.2 -8053.32 -23849.2 -8053.32
M4 -18600.63211 4015.844754 -4.63181 3.35E-05 -26699.4 -10501.9 -26699.4 -10501.9
M5 -12907.21003 4023.872017 -3.20766 0.002528 -21022.1 -4792.3 -21022.1 -4792.3
M6 -12093.15355 4381.992013 -2.75974 0.008466 -20930.3 -3256.02 -20930.3 -3256.02
M7 -21272.44535 4485.252614 -4.74275 2.34E-05 -30317.8 -12227.1 -30317.8 -12227.1
M8 -8650.200138 4425.018645 -1.95484 0.057123 -17574.1 273.7004 -17574.1 273.7004
M9 -6013.823246 4260.612806 -1.41149 0.165295 -14606.2 2578.521 -14606.2 2578.521
M10 -5141.092497 4149.288839 -1.23903 0.222055 -13508.9 3226.746 -13508.9 3226.746
M11 676.8421043 4014.300442 0.168608 0.866896 -7418.77 8772.45 -7418.77 8772.45
M12 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
SAI 25427.42637 1789.269704 14.21106 #NUM! 21819.02 29035.83 21819.02 29035.83






















df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 1.06E+10 6.61E+08 25.09546 1.07E-16














Intercept 105668.1 37053.49 2.851771 0.006543 31038.5 180297.6 31038.5 180297.6
Price -0.07809 0.039579 -1.97301 0.054656 -0.15781 0.001627 -0.15781 0.001627
Period 352.6685 92.20784 3.824713 0.000401 166.9524 538.3846 166.9524 538.3846
M1 -12751.7 3844.306 -3.31702 0.001807 -20494.5 -5008.83 -20494.5 -5008.83
M2 -17617.7 3979.917 -4.42665 6.03E-05 -25633.7 -9601.75 -25633.7 -9601.75
M3 -15884.9 3897.898 -4.07526 0.000184 -23735.7 -8034.17 -23735.7 -8034.17
M4 -18551.9 3997.671 -4.64069 3.01E-05 -26603.7 -10500.2 -26603.7 -10500.2
M5 -12877.4 4006.215 -3.21436 0.00242 -20946.3 -4808.47 -20946.3 -4808.47
M6 -10941.3 4014.41 -2.72549 0.009114 -19026.7 -2855.82 -19026.7 -2855.82
M7 -21164.9 4462.384 -4.74295 2.15E-05 -30152.6 -12177.2 -30152.6 -12177.2
M8 -8562.27 4403.514 -1.94442 0.058112 -17431.4 306.8617 -17431.4 306.8617
M9 -5947 4240.85 -1.40231 0.167683 -14488.5 2594.507 -14488.5 2594.507
M10 -5094.94 4130.795 -1.23341 0.223829 -13414.8 3224.905 -13414.8 3224.905
M11 701.362 3996.977 0.175473 0.861495 -7348.96 8751.686 -7348.96 8751.686
M12 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
SAI 25137.21 1763.213 14.25648 #NUM! 21585.92 28688.5 21585.92 28688.5






















df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 1.07E+10 6.68E+08 25.87339 1.82E-17














Intercept 105433.2 36597.7 2.880871 0.005957 31808.18 179058.3 31808.18 179058.3
Price -0.07785 0.039121 -1.98989 0.052438 -0.15655 0.000855 -0.15655 0.000855
Period 359.7377 88.33836 4.072271 0.000177 182.0239 537.4516 182.0239 537.4516
M1 -12706.3 3799.757 -3.34397 0.001629 -20350.4 -5062.14 -20350.4 -5062.14
M2 -17577.5 3934.496 -4.46753 4.96E-05 -25492.7 -9662.3 -25492.7 -9662.3
M3 -15853.1 3854.74 -4.11263 0.000156 -23607.8 -8098.37 -23607.8 -8098.37
M4 -18525.9 3954.046 -4.68531 2.42E-05 -26480.5 -10571.4 -26480.5 -10571.4
M5 -12858.6 3963.291 -3.24442 0.00217 -20831.7 -4885.45 -20831.7 -4885.45
M6 -10929.6 3972.05 -2.75163 0.008397 -18920.3 -2938.88 -18920.3 -2938.88
M7 -20676.4 4065.003 -5.08643 6.28E-06 -28854.1 -12498.6 -28854.1 -12498.6
M8 -8520.36 4353.563 -1.9571 0.05629 -17278.6 237.8758 -17278.6 237.8758
M9 -5914.64 4194.267 -1.41017 0.165073 -14352.4 2523.136 -14352.4 2523.136
M10 -5071.66 4086.618 -1.24104 0.22075 -13292.9 3149.559 -13292.9 3149.559
M11 714.5486 3955.292 0.180656 0.857414 -7242.47 8671.569 -7242.47 8671.569
M12 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
SAI 24881.85 1727.352 14.40462 #NUM! 21406.86 28356.83 21406.86 28356.83






















df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 1.16E+10 7.24E+08 23.89587 2.83E-17














Intercept 109025 39625.38 2.751393 0.008294 29394.83 188655.2 29394.83 188655.2
Price -0.08288 0.042342 -1.95744 0.056004 -0.16797 0.002207 -0.16797 0.002207
Period 433.822 91.99447 4.71574 2.04E-05 248.9522 618.6918 248.9522 618.6918
M1 -12543.1 4115.504 -3.04776 0.003709 -20813.5 -4272.66 -20813.5 -4272.66
M2 -17527.9 4261.861 -4.11273 0.000149 -26092.4 -8963.33 -26092.4 -8963.33
M3 -15850.2 4175.531 -3.79597 0.000406 -24241.2 -7459.13 -24241.2 -7459.13
M4 -18622.5 4283.002 -4.34799 6.93E-05 -27229.5 -10015.4 -27229.5 -10015.4
M5 -13027.2 4292.765 -3.0347 0.003847 -21653.9 -4400.6 -21653.9 -4400.6
M6 -11169.9 4301.855 -2.59652 0.012396 -19814.8 -2524.95 -19814.8 -2524.95
M7 -21009.9 4401.838 -4.77297 1.68E-05 -29855.7 -12164 -29855.7 -12164
M8 -3954.96 4422.786 -0.89422 0.375573 -12842.9 4932.958 -12842.9 4932.958
M9 -5922.55 4543.318 -1.30357 0.198471 -15052.7 3207.591 -15052.7 3207.591
M10 -5112.24 4426.704 -1.15486 0.253747 -14008 3783.551 -14008 3783.551
M11 662.4165 4284.438 0.15461 0.877764 -7947.48 9272.318 -7947.48 9272.318
M12 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
SAI 24738.29 1853.009 13.35034 #NUM! 21014.53 28462.05 21014.53 28462.05






















df SS MS F
Significa
nce F
Regression 16 1.18E+10 7.37E+08 24.54694 5.43E-18














Intercept 101811.3 38593.4 2.638049 0.011028 24331.79 179290.8 24331.79 179290.8
Price -0.07464 0.041141 -1.81429 0.075517 -0.15723 0.007952 -0.15723 0.007952
Period 405.5133 86.11249 4.709111 1.95E-05 232.6352 578.3913 232.6352 578.3913
M1 -12345.5 4091.215 -3.01757 0.00397 -20559 -4132.07 -20559 -4132.07
M2 -17237.4 4230.455 -4.07459 0.000161 -25730.4 -8744.39 -25730.4 -8744.39
M3 -15576.2 4145.682 -3.75722 0.000443 -23899 -7253.42 -23899 -7253.42
M4 -18278.7 4246.67 -4.30424 7.61E-05 -26804.2 -9753.16 -26804.2 -9753.16
M5 -12658.3 4253.84 -2.97574 0.00446 -21198.3 -4118.37 -21198.3 -4118.37
M6 -10776.7 4260.28 -2.52958 0.014552 -19329.6 -2223.87 -19329.6 -2223.87
M7 -20557 4353.172 -4.72231 1.86E-05 -29296.4 -11817.7 -29296.4 -11817.7
M8 -3474.91 4370.602 -0.79506 0.430261 -12249.3 5299.444 -12249.3 5299.444
M9 -7077.17 4344.28 -1.62908 0.109459 -15798.7 1644.333 -15798.7 1644.333
M10 -4859.99 4398.029 -1.10504 0.274329 -13689.4 3969.42 -13689.4 3969.42
M11 840.6406 4260.777 0.197297 0.844379 -7713.23 9394.507 -7713.23 9394.507
M12 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
SAI 24300.93 1811.228 13.41683 #NUM! 20664.74 27937.13 20664.74 27937.13



















796,991.94 843,873.82 890,755.70 937,637.58     984,519.45 1,031,401.33 1,078,283.21  
821,690.93          35.86% 35.67% 35.61% 35.67% 35.87% 36.20% 36.67%
870,025.69          34.99% 34.80% 34.74% 34.81% 35.00% 35.33% 35.79%
918,360.45          33.84% 33.65% 33.59% 33.66% 33.85% 34.17% 34.63%
966,695.21          32.37% 32.19% 32.13% 32.19% 32.38% 32.69% 33.14%
1,015,029.97       30.55% 30.38% 30.32% 30.38% 30.56% 30.87% 31.30%
1,063,364.73       28.32% 28.16% 28.10% 28.16% 28.34% 28.63% 29.04%
1,111,699.49       25.62% 25.47% 25.42% 25.47% 25.63% 25.91% 26.30%
1-May-16
788,234.36 834,601.09 880,967.82 927,334.55     973,701.27 1,020,068.00 1,066,434.73  
796,991.94          37.90% 37.51% 37.22% 37.05% 36.98% 37.02% 37.16%
843,873.82          37.64% 37.24% 36.96% 36.79% 36.72% 36.75% 36.90%
890,755.70          37.18% 36.79% 36.51% 36.34% 36.27% 36.30% 36.44%
937,637.58          36.53% 36.14% 35.86% 35.69% 35.62% 35.66% 35.80%
984,519.45          35.67% 35.28% 35.01% 34.84% 34.77% 34.80% 34.94%
1,031,401.33       34.58% 34.20% 33.93% 33.76% 33.69% 33.73% 33.86%
1,078,283.21       33.24% 32.87% 32.60% 32.44% 32.37% 32.41% 32.54%
1-Jun-16
800,434.80 847,519.20 894,603.60 941,688.00     988,772.40 1,035,856.80 1,082,941.20  
788,234.36          38.41% 37.97% 37.65% 37.42% 37.30% 37.28% 37.36%
834,601.09          38.33% 37.89% 37.56% 37.34% 37.22% 37.20% 37.28%
880,967.82          38.08% 37.64% 37.32% 37.10% 36.98% 36.96% 37.03%
927,334.55          37.66% 37.23% 36.90% 36.68% 36.56% 36.54% 36.62%
973,701.27          37.07% 36.64% 36.31% 36.10% 35.98% 35.96% 36.03%
1,020,068.00       36.29% 35.86% 35.54% 35.32% 35.21% 35.19% 35.26%





























796,991.94      843,873.82 890,755.70         937,637.58   984,519.45     1,031,401.33  1,078,283.21  
821,690.93     35.16% 36.28% 37.48% 38.76% 40.13% 41.59% 43.18%
870,025.69     33.02% 34.11% 35.28% 36.52% 37.86% 39.30% 40.86%
918,360.45     30.74% 31.79% 32.91% 34.12% 35.42% 36.83% 38.34%
966,695.21     28.29% 29.30% 30.37% 31.53% 32.78% 34.14% 35.61%
1,015,029.97  25.67% 26.62% 27.63% 28.73% 29.92% 31.21% 32.61%
1,063,364.73  22.85% 23.72% 24.67% 25.69% 26.80% 28.01% 29.33%
1,111,699.49  19.81% 20.59% 21.45% 22.38% 23.39% 24.49% 25.71%
1-May-16
0.39                  788,234.36      834,601.09 880,967.82         927,334.55   973,701.27     1,020,068.00  1,066,434.73  
796,991.94     37.64% 38.59% 39.59% 40.65% 41.76% 42.93% 44.17%
843,873.82     36.05% 36.98% 37.97% 39.01% 40.10% 41.26% 42.49%
890,755.70     34.37% 35.29% 36.25% 37.27% 38.35% 39.49% 40.71%
937,637.58     32.61% 33.50% 34.44% 35.44% 36.49% 37.61% 38.81%
984,519.45     30.74% 31.61% 32.52% 33.49% 34.52% 35.61% 36.78%
1,031,401.33  28.77% 29.60% 30.49% 31.42% 32.42% 33.48% 34.62%
1,078,283.21  26.68% 27.48% 28.33% 29.22% 30.18% 31.20% 32.30%
1-Jun-16
0.38                  800,434.80      847,519.20 894,603.60         941,688.00   988,772.40     1,035,856.80  1,082,941.20  
788,234.36     38.78% 39.70% 40.66% 41.67% 42.74% 43.86% 45.04%
834,601.09     37.35% 38.25% 39.21% 40.21% 41.26% 42.37% 43.54%
880,967.82     35.85% 36.74% 37.68% 38.66% 39.70% 40.80% 41.96%
927,334.55     34.28% 35.15% 36.07% 37.04% 38.06% 39.15% 40.29%
973,701.27     32.62% 33.48% 34.38% 35.33% 36.33% 37.39% 38.52%
1,020,068.00  30.89% 31.72% 32.59% 33.52% 34.50% 35.54% 36.64%




















773,551.00                47,657,229,948IDR   27,877,325,139IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   27,877,325,139IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   27,877,325,139IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         27,877,325,139IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   27,877,325,139IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   27,877,325,139IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   27,877,325,139IDR   
819,054.00                47,657,229,948IDR   26,623,190,335IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   26,623,190,335IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   26,623,190,335IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         26,623,190,335IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   26,623,190,335IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   26,623,190,335IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   26,623,190,335IDR   
864,557.00                47,657,229,948IDR   25,047,502,480IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   25,047,502,480IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   25,047,502,480IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         25,047,502,480IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   25,047,502,480IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   25,047,502,480IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   25,047,502,480IDR   
910,060.00                47,657,229,948IDR   23,150,261,574IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   23,150,261,574IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   23,150,261,574IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR   23,150,261,574IDR   44,534,567,504IDR   23,150,261,574IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   23,150,261,574IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   23,150,261,574IDR   
955,563.00                47,657,229,948IDR   20,931,467,616IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   20,931,467,616IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   20,931,467,616IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         20,931,467,616IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   20,931,467,616IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   20,931,467,616IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   20,931,467,616IDR   
1,001,066.00             47,657,229,948IDR   18,391,120,608IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   18,391,120,608IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   18,391,120,608IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         18,391,120,608IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   18,391,120,608IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   18,391,120,608IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   18,391,120,608IDR   
1,046,569.00             47,657,229,948IDR   15,529,220,548IDR  47,388,568,920IDR   15,529,220,548IDR   46,778,571,503IDR   15,529,220,548IDR                    45,827,237,698IDR                         15,529,220,548IDR                         44,534,567,504IDR   15,529,220,548IDR   42,900,560,922IDR   15,529,220,548IDR   40,925,217,951IDR   15,529,220,548IDR   
0.6% 1.3% 2.0% -2.8% -3.7% -4.6%
1-May-16
765,051.00                $52,457,482,234 $32,850,434,417 $52,512,458,788 $32,850,434,417 $52,230,684,486 $32,850,434,417 $51,612,159,330 $32,850,434,417 $50,656,883,319 $32,850,434,417 $49,364,856,453 $32,850,434,417 $47,736,078,732 $32,850,434,417
810,054.00                $52,457,482,234 $31,927,713,319 $52,512,458,788 $31,927,713,319 $52,230,684,486 $31,927,713,319 $51,612,159,330 $31,927,713,319 $50,656,883,319 $31,927,713,319 $49,364,856,453 $31,927,713,319 $47,736,078,732 $31,927,713,319
855,057.00                $52,457,482,234 $30,687,758,933 $52,512,458,788 $30,687,758,933 $52,230,684,486 $30,687,758,933 $51,612,159,330 $30,687,758,933 $50,656,883,319 $30,687,758,933 $49,364,856,453 $30,687,758,933 $47,736,078,732 $30,687,758,933
900,060.00                $52,457,482,234 $29,130,571,258 $52,512,458,788 $29,130,571,258 $52,230,684,486 $29,130,571,258 $51,612,159,330 $29,130,571,258 $50,656,883,319 $29,130,571,258 $49,364,856,453 $29,130,571,258 $47,736,078,732 $29,130,571,258
945,063.00                $52,457,482,234 $27,256,150,296 $52,512,458,788 $27,256,150,296 $52,230,684,486 $27,256,150,296 $51,612,159,330 $27,256,150,296 $50,656,883,319 $27,256,150,296 $49,364,856,453 $27,256,150,296 $47,736,078,732 $27,256,150,296
990,066.00                $52,457,482,234 $25,064,496,045 $52,512,458,788 $25,064,496,045 $52,230,684,486 $25,064,496,045 $51,612,159,330 $25,064,496,045 $50,656,883,319 $25,064,496,045 $49,364,856,453 $25,064,496,045 $47,736,078,732 $25,064,496,045
1,035,069.00             $52,457,482,234 $22,555,608,506 $52,512,458,788 $22,555,608,506 $52,230,684,486 $22,555,608,506 $51,612,159,330 $22,555,608,506 $50,656,883,319 $22,555,608,506 $49,364,856,453 $22,555,608,506 $47,736,078,732 $22,555,608,506
1-Jun-16
778,122.30                $54,379,924,374 $34,660,023,380 $54,462,560,900 $34,660,023,380 $54,198,954,919 $34,660,023,380 $53,589,106,433 $34,660,023,380 $52,633,015,440 $34,660,023,380 $51,330,681,941 $34,660,023,380 $49,682,105,936 $34,660,023,380
823,894.20                $54,379,924,374 $33,753,974,460 $54,462,560,900 $33,753,974,460 $54,198,954,919 $33,753,974,460 $53,589,106,433 $33,753,974,460 $52,633,015,440 $33,753,974,460 $51,330,681,941 $33,753,974,460 $49,682,105,936 $33,753,974,460
869,666.10                $54,379,924,374 $32,520,717,338 $54,462,560,900 $32,520,717,338 $54,198,954,919 $32,520,717,338 $53,589,106,433 $32,520,717,338 $52,633,015,440 $32,520,717,338 $51,330,681,941 $32,520,717,338 $49,682,105,936 $32,520,717,338
915,438.00                $54,379,924,374 $30,960,252,013 $54,462,560,900 $30,960,252,013 $54,198,954,919 $30,960,252,013 $53,589,106,433 $30,960,252,013 $52,633,015,440 $30,960,252,013 $51,330,681,941 $30,960,252,013 $49,682,105,936 $30,960,252,013
961,209.90                $54,379,924,374 $29,072,578,485 $54,462,560,900 $29,072,578,485 $54,198,954,919 $29,072,578,485 $53,589,106,433 $29,072,578,485 $52,633,015,440 $29,072,578,485 $51,330,681,941 $29,072,578,485 $49,682,105,936 $29,072,578,485
1,006,981.80             $54,379,924,374 $26,857,696,754 $54,462,560,900 $26,857,696,754 $54,198,954,919 $26,857,696,754 $53,589,106,433 $26,857,696,754 $52,633,015,440 $26,857,696,754 $51,330,681,941 $26,857,696,754 $49,682,105,936 $26,857,696,754
1,052,753.70             $54,379,924,374 $24,315,606,821 $54,462,560,900 $24,315,606,821 $54,198,954,919 $24,315,606,821 $53,589,106,433 $24,315,606,821 $52,633,015,440 $24,315,606,821 $51,330,681,941 $24,315,606,821 $49,682,105,936 $24,315,606,821
1,035,856.80                                                           1,082,941.20                                                           
SAI
Payoff SAI, Payoff SP
800,434.80                                                              847,519.20                                                              894,603.60                                                                               941,688.00                                                                                                           988,772.40                                                              
SAI
Payoff SAI, Payoff SP
1,031,401.33                                                           1,078,283.21                                                           
788,234.36                                                              834,601.09                                                              880,967.82                                                                               927,334.55                                                                                                           973,701.27                                                              1,020,068.00                                                           
984,519.45                                                              
1,066,434.73                                                           
Payoff SAI, Payoff SP













0.00% 796,991.94                      843,873.82                      890,755.70                      937,637.58                                        984,519.45                      1,031,401.33                  1,078,283.21                  
773,551.00     (52,219,238.46)IDR       (52,219,238.46)IDR       (52,219,238.46)IDR       (52,219,238.46)IDR                         (52,219,238.46)IDR       (52,219,238.46)IDR       (52,219,238.46)IDR       
819,054.00     1,431,966,667.68IDR   1,431,966,667.68IDR   1,431,966,667.68IDR   1,431,966,667.68IDR                     1,431,966,667.68IDR   1,431,966,667.68IDR   1,431,966,667.68IDR   
864,557.00     2,594,599,522.76IDR   2,594,599,522.76IDR   2,594,599,522.76IDR   2,594,599,522.76IDR                     2,594,599,522.76IDR   2,594,599,522.76IDR   2,594,599,522.76IDR   
910,060.00     3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   3,435,679,326.79IDR   
955,563.00     3,955,206,079.76IDR   3,955,206,079.76IDR   3,955,206,079.76IDR   3,955,206,079.76IDR                     3,955,206,079.76IDR   3,955,206,079.76IDR   3,955,206,079.76IDR   
1,001,066.00  4,153,179,781.68IDR   4,153,179,781.68IDR   4,153,179,781.68IDR   4,153,179,781.68IDR                     4,153,179,781.68IDR   4,153,179,781.68IDR   4,153,179,781.68IDR   
1,046,569.00  4,029,600,432.55IDR   4,029,600,432.55IDR   4,029,600,432.55IDR   4,029,600,432.55IDR                     4,029,600,432.55IDR   4,029,600,432.55IDR   4,029,600,432.55IDR   
1-May-16
788,234.36                      834,601.09                      880,967.82                      927,334.55                                        973,701.27                      1,020,068.00                  1,066,434.73                  
765,051.00     (427,198,934.47)IDR     (427,198,934.47)IDR     (427,198,934.47)IDR     (427,198,934.47)IDR                       (427,198,934.47)IDR     (427,198,934.47)IDR     (427,198,934.47)IDR     
810,054.00     1,381,628,956.45IDR   1,381,628,956.45IDR   1,381,628,956.45IDR   1,381,628,956.45IDR                     1,381,628,956.45IDR   1,381,628,956.45IDR   1,381,628,956.45IDR   
855,057.00     2,873,223,559.23IDR   2,873,223,559.23IDR   2,873,223,559.23IDR   2,873,223,559.23IDR                     2,873,223,559.23IDR   2,873,223,559.23IDR   2,873,223,559.23IDR   
900,060.00     4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   4,047,584,873.86IDR   
945,063.00     4,904,712,900.34IDR   4,904,712,900.34IDR   4,904,712,900.34IDR   4,904,712,900.34IDR                     4,904,712,900.34IDR   4,904,712,900.34IDR   4,904,712,900.34IDR   
990,066.00     5,444,607,638.68IDR   5,444,607,638.68IDR   5,444,607,638.68IDR   5,444,607,638.68IDR                     5,444,607,638.68IDR   5,444,607,638.68IDR   5,444,607,638.68IDR   
1,035,069.00  5,667,269,088.86IDR   5,667,269,088.86IDR   5,667,269,088.86IDR   5,667,269,088.86IDR                     5,667,269,088.86IDR   5,667,269,088.86IDR   5,667,269,088.86IDR   
1-Jun-16
0.38                  800,434.80                      847,519.20                      894,603.60                      941,688.00                                        988,772.40                      1,035,856.80                  1,082,941.20                  
778,122.30     139,077,097.52IDR       139,077,097.52IDR       139,077,097.52IDR       139,077,097.52IDR                         139,077,097.52IDR       139,077,097.52IDR       139,077,097.52IDR       
823,894.20     2,003,137,754.88IDR   2,003,137,754.88IDR   2,003,137,754.88IDR   2,003,137,754.88IDR                     2,003,137,754.88IDR   2,003,137,754.88IDR   2,003,137,754.88IDR   
869,666.10     3,539,990,209.54IDR   3,539,990,209.54IDR   3,539,990,209.54IDR   3,539,990,209.54IDR                     3,539,990,209.54IDR   3,539,990,209.54IDR   3,539,990,209.54IDR   
915,438.00     4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   4,749,634,461.48IDR   
961,209.90     5,632,070,510.71IDR   5,632,070,510.71IDR   5,632,070,510.71IDR   5,632,070,510.71IDR                     5,632,070,510.71IDR   5,632,070,510.71IDR   5,632,070,510.71IDR   
1,006,981.80  6,187,298,357.23IDR   6,187,298,357.23IDR   6,187,298,357.23IDR   6,187,298,357.23IDR                     6,187,298,357.23IDR   6,187,298,357.23IDR   6,187,298,357.23IDR   

















0.00% 796,991.94                         843,873.82                         890,755.70                         937,637.58                                           984,519.45                         1,031,401.33                     1,078,283.21                     
773,551.00     7,242,456,680.06IDR      9,431,057,051.51IDR      11,278,321,034.52IDR   12,784,248,629.07IDR                      13,948,839,835.19IDR   14,772,094,652.85IDR   15,254,013,082.07IDR   
819,054.00     8,726,642,586.20IDR      10,915,242,957.65IDR   12,762,506,940.65IDR   14,268,434,535.21IDR                      15,433,025,741.32IDR   16,256,280,558.99IDR   16,738,198,988.21IDR   
864,557.00     9,889,275,441.28IDR      12,077,875,812.73IDR   13,925,139,795.73IDR   15,431,067,390.29IDR                      16,595,658,596.40IDR   17,418,913,414.07IDR   17,900,831,843.29IDR   
910,060.00     10,730,355,245.31IDR   12,918,955,616.75IDR   14,766,219,599.76IDR   16,272,147,194.31IDR   17,436,738,400.43IDR   18,259,993,218.09IDR   18,741,911,647.31IDR   
955,563.00     11,249,881,998.28IDR   13,438,482,369.73IDR   15,285,746,352.73IDR   16,791,673,947.29IDR                      17,956,265,153.40IDR   18,779,519,971.07IDR   19,261,438,400.29IDR   
1,001,066.00  11,447,855,700.20IDR   13,636,456,071.65IDR   15,483,720,054.65IDR   16,989,647,649.21IDR                      18,154,238,855.32IDR   18,977,493,672.99IDR   19,459,412,102.21IDR   
1,046,569.00  11,324,276,351.07IDR   13,512,876,722.52IDR   15,360,140,705.52IDR   16,866,068,300.08IDR                      18,030,659,506.19IDR   18,853,914,323.86IDR   19,335,832,753.08IDR   
1-May-16
788,234.36                         834,601.09                         880,967.82                         927,334.55                                           973,701.27                         1,020,068.00                     1,066,434.73                     
765,051.00     7,108,617,686.45IDR      9,614,778,963.82IDR      11,784,189,386.19IDR   13,616,848,953.55IDR                      15,112,757,665.92IDR   16,271,915,523.27IDR   17,094,322,525.63IDR   
810,054.00     8,917,445,577.38IDR      11,423,606,854.75IDR   13,593,017,277.12IDR   15,425,676,844.48IDR                      16,921,585,556.84IDR   18,080,743,414.20IDR   18,903,150,416.55IDR   
855,057.00     10,409,040,180.16IDR   12,915,201,457.53IDR   15,084,611,879.89IDR   16,917,271,447.26IDR                      18,413,180,159.62IDR   19,572,338,016.98IDR   20,394,745,019.33IDR   
900,060.00     11,583,401,494.79IDR   14,089,562,772.16IDR   16,258,973,194.52IDR   18,091,632,761.89IDR   19,587,541,474.25IDR   20,746,699,331.61IDR   21,569,106,333.96IDR   
945,063.00     12,440,529,521.27IDR   14,946,690,798.64IDR   17,116,101,221.01IDR   18,948,760,788.37IDR                      20,444,669,500.73IDR   21,603,827,358.09IDR   22,426,234,360.44IDR   
990,066.00     12,980,424,259.60IDR   15,486,585,536.97IDR   17,655,995,959.34IDR   19,488,655,526.71IDR                      20,984,564,239.07IDR   22,143,722,096.42IDR   22,966,129,098.78IDR   
1,035,069.00  13,203,085,709.79IDR   15,709,246,987.16IDR   17,878,657,409.53IDR   19,711,316,976.89IDR                      21,207,225,689.25IDR   22,366,383,546.61IDR   23,188,790,548.96IDR   
1-Jun-16
-                    800,434.80                         -                                        847,519.20                         -                                                          894,603.60                         -                                        941,688.00                         
778,122.30     8,660,864,178.62IDR      11,225,359,787.52IDR   13,443,612,890.28IDR   15,315,623,486.91IDR                      16,841,391,577.39IDR   18,020,917,161.75IDR   18,854,200,239.96IDR   
823,894.20     10,524,924,835.99IDR   13,089,420,444.88IDR   15,307,673,547.64IDR   17,179,684,144.27IDR                      18,705,452,234.76IDR   19,884,977,819.11IDR   20,718,260,897.33IDR   
869,666.10     12,061,777,290.64IDR   14,626,272,899.54IDR   16,844,526,002.30IDR   18,716,536,598.92IDR                      20,242,304,689.41IDR   21,421,830,273.76IDR   22,255,113,351.98IDR   
915,438.00     13,271,421,542.58IDR   15,835,917,151.48IDR   18,054,170,254.24IDR   19,926,180,850.87IDR   21,451,948,941.35IDR   22,631,474,525.71IDR   23,464,757,603.92IDR   
961,209.90     14,153,857,591.81IDR   16,718,353,200.71IDR   18,936,606,303.47IDR   20,808,616,900.10IDR                      22,334,384,990.59IDR   23,513,910,574.94IDR   24,347,193,653.15IDR   
1,006,981.80  14,709,085,438.33IDR   17,273,581,047.23IDR   19,491,834,149.99IDR   21,363,844,746.62IDR                      22,889,612,837.11IDR   24,069,138,421.46IDR   24,902,421,499.67IDR   













Profit Share in Aceh Region From April 2016 – June 2016 
 
 
 Kalimantan Selatan 
Regression Model 
January 2014 – July 2016 
Volume = - 0.0155 Price - 325 Periode + 48313 M1 + 42911 M2 + 45892 M3  
         + 46551 M4 + 48715 M5 + 46091 M6 + 43294 M7 + 49524 M8 + 52213 M9  
         + 53524 M10 + 52703 M11 + 53535 M12 - 5562 ITP - 23843 HI - 15213 SG  








33.56% 796,991.94 843,873.82 890,755.70          937,637.58 984,519.45 1,031,401.33  1,078,283.21  
773,551.00     0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
819,054.00     16.41% 13.12% 11.22% 10.04% 9.28% 8.81% 8.56%
864,557.00     26.24% 21.48% 18.63% 16.81% 15.63% 14.90% 14.49%
910,060.00     32.02% 26.59% 23.27% 21.11% 19.70% 18.82% 18.33%
955,563.00     35.16% 29.43% 25.88% 23.55% 22.03% 21.06% 20.53%
1,001,066.00  36.28% 30.46% 26.82% 24.45% 22.88% 21.88% 21.34%
1,046,569.00  35.58% 29.82% 26.23% 23.89% 22.35% 21.37% 20.84%
1-May-16
788,234.36 834,601.09 880,967.82          927,334.55 973,701.27 1,020,068.00  1,066,434.73  
765,051.00     0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
810,054.00     15.49% 12.09% 10.16% 8.96% 8.16% 7.64% 7.31%
855,057.00     27.60% 22.25% 19.05% 16.98% 15.60% 14.68% 14.09%
900,060.00     34.94% 28.73% 24.89% 22.37% 20.66% 19.51% 18.77%
945,063.00     39.43% 32.81% 28.66% 25.88% 23.99% 22.70% 21.87%
990,066.00     41.94% 35.16% 30.84% 27.94% 25.95% 24.59% 23.71%
1,035,069.00  42.92% 36.08% 31.70% 28.75% 26.72% 25.34% 24.44%
1-Jun-16
0.38                  800,434.80 847,519.20 894,603.60          941,688.00 988,772.40 1,035,856.80  1,082,941.20  
778,122.30     1.61% 1.24% 1.03% 0.91% 0.83% 0.77% 0.74%
823,894.20     19.03% 15.30% 13.09% 11.66% 10.71% 10.07% 9.67%
869,666.10     29.35% 24.20% 21.02% 18.91% 17.49% 16.53% 15.91%
915,438.00     35.79% 29.99% 26.31% 23.84% 22.14% 20.99% 20.24%
961,209.90     39.79% 33.69% 29.74% 27.07% 25.22% 23.95% 23.13%
1,006,981.80  42.06% 35.82% 31.74% 28.96% 27.03% 25.71% 24.85%













January 2014 – August 2016 
Volume = - 0.0172 Price - 312 Periode + 49947 M1 + 44399 M2 + 47325 M3 
         + 48102 M4 + 50190 M5 + 47597 M6 + 45962 M7 + 51180 M8 + 53936 M9 
         + 55212 M10 + 54336 M11 + 55197 M12 - 6021 ITP - 24069 HI - 15574 SG 
         - 22580 ST - 29280 SBM     
 
January 2014 – September 2016 
Volume = - 0.0180 Price - 307 Periode + 50673 M1 + 45057 M2 + 47964 M3  
         + 48799 M4 + 50852 M5 + 48277 M6 + 46628 M7 + 52371 M8 + 54709 M9 
         + 55970 M10 + 55069 M11 + 55946 M12 - 5950 ITP - 24187 HI - 15740 SG  
         - 22625 ST - 29330 SBM 
      
COGS Estimation 
  ITP HI SG CCI ST 
Factory 
Location Kalsel Jatim Jatim Kalsel Sulsel 
COGS 
Estimation 
       
600,000  
         
700,000  
         
700,000  
         
550,000  























Payoff Table Calculation 





Payoff ITP Lower ITP 706,765  706,765        706,765  743,963        743,963  743,963        781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601        828,031  749,171        788,601  828,031        749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171        636,088        751,737        28.2% 28.4% 28.6% 27.7% 27.9% 28.1% 27.1% 27.3% 27.6%
749,171        636,088        791,302        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.9% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.6% 27.8%
749,171        636,088        830,867        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
749,171        669,567        751,737        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.8% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.5% 27.7%
749,171        669,567        791,302        28.6% 28.8% 29.0% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 28.0%
749,171        669,567        830,867        28.8% 29.0% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
749,171        703,045        751,737        28.5% 28.8% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 27.9%
749,171        703,045        791,302        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 27.9% 28.2%
749,171        703,045        830,867        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        636,088        751,737        28.4% 28.6% 28.8% 27.9% 28.1% 28.3% 27.3% 27.6% 27.8%
788,601        636,088        791,302        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
788,601        636,088        830,867        28.8% 29.1% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.8% 27.8% 28.0% 28.2%
788,601        669,567        751,737        28.6% 28.8% 29.0% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.5% 27.7% 28.0%
788,601        669,567        791,302        28.8% 29.0% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
788,601        669,567        830,867        29.0% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.7% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        703,045        751,737        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 27.9% 28.1%
788,601        703,045        791,302        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.2% 28.4%
788,601        703,045        830,867        29.2% 29.4% 29.7% 28.7% 28.9% 29.1% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%
828,031        636,088        751,737        28.6% 28.8% 29.1% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 27.6% 27.8% 28.0%
828,031        636,088        791,302        28.8% 29.1% 29.3% 28.3% 28.5% 28.8% 27.8% 28.0% 28.2%
828,031        636,088        830,867        29.1% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.8% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
828,031        669,567        751,737        28.8% 29.0% 29.2% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 27.7% 28.0% 28.2%
828,031        669,567        791,302        29.0% 29.3% 29.5% 28.5% 28.7% 29.0% 28.0% 28.2% 28.4%
828,031        669,567        830,867        29.3% 29.5% 29.7% 28.7% 29.0% 29.2% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%
828,031        703,045        751,737        29.0% 29.2% 29.4% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 27.9% 28.1% 28.4%
828,031        703,045        791,302        29.2% 29.4% 29.7% 28.7% 28.9% 29.1% 28.2% 28.4% 28.6%
828,031        703,045        830,867        29.4% 29.7% 29.9% 28.9% 29.1% 29.4% 28.4% 28.6% 28.8%
Payoff HI lower ITP 706,765  706,765        706,765  743,963        743,963  743,963        781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601        828,031  749,171        788,601  828,031        749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171        636,088        751,737        8.2% 7.5% 6.7% 8.2% 7.5% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.8%
749,171        636,088        791,302        8.2% 7.5% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9%
749,171        636,088        830,867        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 7.0%
749,171        669,567        751,737        8.2% 7.5% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9%
749,171        669,567        791,302        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9%
749,171        669,567        830,867        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
749,171        703,045        751,737        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9%
749,171        703,045        791,302        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
749,171        703,045        830,867        8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.0%
788,601        636,088        751,737        8.2% 7.5% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9%
788,601        636,088        791,302        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 7.0%
788,601        636,088        830,867        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
788,601        669,567        751,737        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9%
788,601        669,567        791,302        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
788,601        669,567        830,867        8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1%
788,601        703,045        751,737        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
788,601        703,045        791,302        8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.0%
788,601        703,045        830,867        8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1% 8.6% 7.9% 7.1%
828,031        636,088        751,737        8.3% 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 7.0%
828,031        636,088        791,302        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
828,031        636,088        830,867        8.4% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1%
828,031        669,567        751,737        8.3% 7.6% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0%
828,031        669,567        791,302        8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1%
828,031        669,567        830,867        8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1% 8.6% 7.9% 7.1%
828,031        703,045        751,737        8.4% 7.7% 6.9% 8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.0%
828,031        703,045        791,302        8.5% 7.7% 7.0% 8.5% 7.8% 7.1% 8.6% 7.9% 7.1%










Payoff SG lower ITP 706,765  706,765        706,765  743,963        743,963  743,963        781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601        828,031  749,171        788,601  828,031        749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171        636,088        751,737        17.1% 17.2% 17.4% 17.2% 17.4% 17.5% 17.4% 17.5% 17.6%
749,171        636,088        791,302        17.2% 17.4% 17.5% 17.4% 17.5% 17.6% 17.5% 17.6% 17.8%
749,171        636,088        830,867        17.4% 17.5% 17.6% 17.5% 17.6% 17.8% 17.6% 17.8% 17.9%
749,171        669,567        751,737        17.2% 17.4% 17.5% 17.3% 17.5% 17.6% 17.5% 17.6% 17.7%
749,171        669,567        791,302        17.4% 17.5% 17.6% 17.5% 17.6% 17.8% 17.6% 17.7% 17.9%
749,171        669,567        830,867        17.5% 17.6% 17.8% 17.6% 17.8% 17.9% 17.7% 17.9% 18.0%
749,171        703,045        751,737        17.3% 17.5% 17.6% 17.5% 17.6% 17.7% 17.6% 17.7% 17.9%
749,171        703,045        791,302        17.5% 17.6% 17.7% 17.6% 17.7% 17.9% 17.7% 17.9% 18.0%
749,171        703,045        830,867        17.6% 17.7% 17.9% 17.7% 17.9% 18.0% 17.9% 18.0% 18.2%
788,601        636,088        751,737        16.5% 16.6% 16.7% 16.6% 16.7% 16.9% 16.7% 16.8% 17.0%
788,601        636,088        791,302        16.6% 16.7% 16.9% 16.7% 16.9% 17.0% 16.8% 17.0% 17.1%
788,601        636,088        830,867        16.7% 16.9% 17.0% 16.9% 17.0% 17.1% 17.0% 17.1% 17.3%
788,601        669,567        751,737        16.6% 16.7% 16.8% 16.7% 16.8% 17.0% 16.8% 17.0% 17.1%
788,601        669,567        791,302        16.7% 16.8% 17.0% 16.8% 17.0% 17.1% 17.0% 17.1% 17.2%
788,601        669,567        830,867        16.8% 17.0% 17.1% 17.0% 17.1% 17.2% 17.1% 17.2% 17.4%
788,601        703,045        751,737        16.7% 16.8% 17.0% 16.8% 16.9% 17.1% 16.9% 17.1% 17.2%
788,601        703,045        791,302        16.8% 17.0% 17.1% 16.9% 17.1% 17.2% 17.1% 17.2% 17.3%
788,601        703,045        830,867        17.0% 17.1% 17.2% 17.1% 17.2% 17.4% 17.2% 17.3% 17.5%
828,031        636,088        751,737        15.8% 16.0% 16.1% 15.9% 16.1% 16.2% 16.1% 16.2% 16.3%
828,031        636,088        791,302        16.0% 16.1% 16.2% 16.1% 16.2% 16.3% 16.2% 16.3% 16.5%
828,031        636,088        830,867        16.1% 16.2% 16.3% 16.2% 16.3% 16.5% 16.3% 16.5% 16.6%
828,031        669,567        751,737        15.9% 16.1% 16.2% 16.1% 16.2% 16.3% 16.2% 16.3% 16.4%
828,031        669,567        791,302        16.1% 16.2% 16.3% 16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.3% 16.4% 16.6%
828,031        669,567        830,867        16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.3% 16.4% 16.6% 16.4% 16.6% 16.7%
828,031        703,045        751,737        16.0% 16.2% 16.3% 16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.3% 16.4% 16.5%
828,031        703,045        791,302        16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.3% 16.4% 16.6% 16.4% 16.5% 16.7%
828,031        703,045        830,867        16.3% 16.4% 16.6% 16.4% 16.6% 16.7% 16.5% 16.7% 16.8%
Payoff CCI lower ITP 706,765  706,765      706,765  743,963      743,963  743,963      781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601      828,031  749,171      788,601  828,031      749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171      636,088      751,737      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.5% 37.8%
749,171      636,088      791,302      37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.5% 37.8% 38.1%
749,171      636,088      830,867      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
749,171      669,567      751,737      36.3% 36.6% 36.9% 36.6% 36.9% 37.1% 36.8% 37.1% 37.4%
749,171      669,567      791,302      36.6% 36.9% 37.2% 36.9% 37.1% 37.4% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7%
749,171      669,567      830,867      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
749,171      703,045      751,737      35.9% 36.2% 36.5% 36.2% 36.4% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0%
749,171      703,045      791,302      36.2% 36.5% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3%
749,171      703,045      830,867      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
788,601      636,088      751,737      37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.5% 37.8% 38.1%
788,601      636,088      791,302      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
788,601      636,088      830,867      37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.1% 38.4% 38.7%
788,601      669,567      751,737      36.6% 36.9% 37.2% 36.9% 37.1% 37.4% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7%
788,601      669,567      791,302      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
788,601      669,567      830,867      37.2% 37.5% 37.8% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3%
788,601      703,045      751,737      36.2% 36.5% 36.7% 36.4% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3%
788,601      703,045      791,302      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
788,601      703,045      830,867      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9%
828,031      636,088      751,737      37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8% 38.1% 38.4%
828,031      636,088      791,302      37.6% 37.9% 38.2% 37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.1% 38.4% 38.7%
828,031      636,088      830,867      37.9% 38.2% 38.5% 38.2% 38.5% 38.8% 38.4% 38.7% 39.1%
828,031      669,567      751,737      36.9% 37.2% 37.5% 37.1% 37.4% 37.7% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0%
828,031      669,567      791,302      37.2% 37.5% 37.8% 37.4% 37.7% 38.0% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3%
828,031      669,567      830,867      37.5% 37.8% 38.1% 37.7% 38.0% 38.3% 38.0% 38.3% 38.6%
828,031      703,045      751,737      36.5% 36.7% 37.0% 36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6%
828,031      703,045      791,302      36.7% 37.0% 37.3% 37.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9%























Payoff ST lower ITP 706,765  706,765        706,765  743,963        743,963  743,963        781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601        828,031  749,171        788,601  828,031        749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171        636,088        751,737        9.8% 9.9% 10.0% 9.9% 10.0% 10.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.1%
749,171        636,088        791,302        9.1% 9.2% 9.3% 9.2% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.4%
749,171        636,088        830,867        8.4% 8.5% 8.6% 8.5% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.7%
749,171        669,567        751,737        9.9% 10.0% 10.1% 10.0% 10.0% 10.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2%
749,171        669,567        791,302        9.2% 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.5%
749,171        669,567        830,867        8.5% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8%
749,171        703,045        751,737        10.0% 10.0% 10.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3%
749,171        703,045        791,302        9.3% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6%
749,171        703,045        830,867        8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.8%
788,601        636,088        751,737        9.9% 10.0% 10.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.2%
788,601        636,088        791,302        9.2% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.5%
788,601        636,088        830,867        8.5% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8%
788,601        669,567        751,737        10.0% 10.1% 10.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3%
788,601        669,567        791,302        9.3% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6%
788,601        669,567        830,867        8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.8%
788,601        703,045        751,737        10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3% 10.2% 10.3% 10.4%
788,601        703,045        791,302        9.3% 9.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5% 9.6% 9.6%
788,601        703,045        830,867        8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.8% 8.8% 8.8% 8.9%
828,031        636,088        751,737        10.0% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.2% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3%
828,031        636,088        791,302        9.3% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6%
828,031        636,088        830,867        8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.8%
828,031        669,567        751,737        10.1% 10.1% 10.2% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3% 10.2% 10.3% 10.4%
828,031        669,567        791,302        9.3% 9.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5% 9.6% 9.6%
828,031        669,567        830,867        8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.8% 8.8% 8.8% 8.9%
828,031        703,045        751,737        10.1% 10.2% 10.3% 10.2% 10.3% 10.4% 10.3% 10.4% 10.4%
828,031        703,045        791,302        9.4% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.7%





Profit (Millions) January 2014 – September 2016 
 
Payoff ITP Lower ITP 706,765       706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963    743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171       788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601    828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  636,088  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  636,088  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  669,567  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  669,567  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  669,567  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  703,045  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  703,045  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
749,171  703,045  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  636,088  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  636,088  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  636,088  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  669,567  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  669,567  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785   3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  669,567  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  703,045  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  703,045  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
788,601  703,045  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  636,088  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  636,088  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  636,088  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  669,567  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  669,567  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  669,567  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  703,045  751,737  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  703,045  791,302  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
828,031  703,045  830,867  2,880            2,880      2,880      3,785      3,785         3,785      4,638      4,638      4,638      
Payoff HI lower ITP 706,765       706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963    743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171       788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601    828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  636,088  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  636,088  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  669,567  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  669,567  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  669,567  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  703,045  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  703,045  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
749,171  703,045  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  636,088  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  636,088  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  636,088  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  669,567  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  669,567  791,302  384               628          814          384          628      814          384          628          814          
788,601  669,567  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  703,045  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  703,045  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
788,601  703,045  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  636,088  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  636,088  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  636,088  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  669,567  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  669,567  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  669,567  830,867  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  703,045  751,737  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          
828,031  703,045  791,302  384               628          814          384          628             814          384          628          814          







Payoff SG lower ITP 706,765       706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963    743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171       788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601    828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  636,088  791,302  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  636,088  830,867  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  669,567  751,737  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  669,567  791,302  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  669,567  830,867  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  703,045  751,737  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  703,045  791,302  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
749,171  703,045  830,867  805               805          805          805          805             805          805          805          805          
788,601  636,088  751,737  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  636,088  791,302  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  636,088  830,867  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  669,567  751,737  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  669,567  791,302  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387   1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  669,567  830,867  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  703,045  751,737  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  703,045  791,302  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
788,601  703,045  830,867  1,387            1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387         1,387      1,387      1,387      1,387      
828,031  636,088  751,737  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  636,088  791,302  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  636,088  830,867  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  669,567  751,737  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  669,567  791,302  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  669,567  830,867  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  703,045  751,737  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  703,045  791,302  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
828,031  703,045  830,867  1,911            1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911         1,911      1,911      1,911      1,911      
Payoff CCI lower ITP 706,765       706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963    743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171       788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601    828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
749,171  636,088  791,302  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
749,171  636,088  830,867  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
749,171  669,567  751,737  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
749,171  669,567  791,302  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
749,171  669,567  830,867  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
749,171  703,045  751,737  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
749,171  703,045  791,302  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
749,171  703,045  830,867  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
788,601  636,088  751,737  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
788,601  636,088  791,302  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
788,601  636,088  830,867  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
788,601  669,567  751,737  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
788,601  669,567  791,302  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130  4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
788,601  669,567  830,867  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
788,601  703,045  751,737  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
788,601  703,045  791,302  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
788,601  703,045  830,867  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
828,031  636,088  751,737  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
828,031  636,088  791,302  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
828,031  636,088  830,867  3,027            3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027         3,027      3,027      3,027      3,027      
828,031  669,567  751,737  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
828,031  669,567  791,302  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
828,031  669,567  830,867  4,130            4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130         4,130      4,130      4,130      4,130      
828,031  703,045  751,737  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      
828,031  703,045  791,302  5,192            5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192         5,192      5,192      5,192      5,192      






Prediction of Cummulative Profits in January 2014 – September 2016 
 
Payoff ST lower ITP 706,765       706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963    743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171       788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601    828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
749,171  636,088  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
749,171  636,088  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
749,171  669,567  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
749,171  669,567  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
749,171  669,567  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
749,171  703,045  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
749,171  703,045  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
749,171  703,045  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
788,601  636,088  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
788,601  636,088  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
788,601  636,088  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
788,601  669,567  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
788,601  669,567  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228   1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
788,601  669,567  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
788,601  703,045  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
788,601  703,045  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
788,601  703,045  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
828,031  636,088  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
828,031  636,088  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
828,031  636,088  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
828,031  669,567  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
828,031  669,567  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
828,031  669,567  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
828,031  703,045  751,737  958               958          958          958          958             958          958          958          958          
828,031  703,045  791,302  1,228            1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228         1,228      1,228      1,228      1,228      
828,031  703,045  830,867  1,440            1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440         1,440      1,440      1,440      1,440      
Payoff ITP Lower ITP 706,765  706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963      743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161      
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171  788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601      828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031      
749,171  636,088  751,737  8,054      8,297      8,484      8,958      9,202          9,389      9,812      10,056    10,242        
749,171  636,088  791,302  8,323      8,567      8,753      9,228      9,472          9,658      10,082    10,326    10,512        
749,171  636,088  830,867  8,535      8,779      8,966      9,440      9,684          9,870      10,294    10,538    10,724        
749,171  669,567  751,737  9,157      9,401      9,587      10,062    10,305        10,492    10,916    11,159    11,346        
749,171  669,567  791,302  9,427      9,670      9,857      10,331    10,575        10,762    11,185    11,429    11,615        
749,171  669,567  830,867  9,639      9,882      10,069    10,544    10,787        10,974    11,397    11,641    11,828        
749,171  703,045  751,737  10,219    10,463    10,649    11,124    11,367        11,554    11,978    12,221    12,408        
749,171  703,045  791,302  10,489    10,732    10,919    11,394    11,637        11,824    12,247    12,491    12,677        
749,171  703,045  830,867  10,701    10,945    11,131    11,606    11,849        12,036    12,460    12,703    12,890        
788,601  636,088  751,737  8,635      8,879      9,065      9,540      9,784          9,970      10,394    10,638    10,824        
788,601  636,088  791,302  8,905      9,149      9,335      9,810      10,053        10,240    10,664    10,907    11,094        
788,601  636,088  830,867  9,117      9,361      9,547      10,022    10,265        10,452    10,876    11,119    11,306        
788,601  669,567  751,737  9,739      9,982      10,169    10,643    10,887        11,073    11,497    11,741    11,927        
788,601  669,567  791,302  10,008    10,252    10,438    10,913    11,157 11,343    11,767    12,011    12,197        
788,601  669,567  830,867  10,220    10,464    10,650    11,125    11,369        11,555    11,979    12,223    12,409        
788,601  703,045  751,737  10,801    11,044    11,231    11,705    11,949        12,135    12,559    12,803    12,989        
788,601  703,045  791,302  11,070    11,314    11,500    11,975    12,219        12,405    12,829    13,073    13,259        
788,601  703,045  830,867  11,282    11,526    11,712    12,187    12,431        12,617    13,041    13,285    13,471        
828,031  636,088  751,737  9,160      9,403      9,590      10,064    10,308        10,494    10,918    11,162    11,348        
828,031  636,088  791,302  9,429      9,673      9,859      10,334    10,578        10,764    11,188    11,432    11,618        
828,031  636,088  830,867  9,641      9,885      10,071    10,546    10,790        10,976    11,400    11,644    11,830        
828,031  669,567  751,737  10,263    10,507    10,693    11,168    11,411        11,598    12,022    12,265    12,452        
828,031  669,567  791,302  10,533    10,776    10,963    11,437    11,681        11,867    12,291    12,535    12,721        
828,031  669,567  830,867  10,745    10,988    11,175    11,649    11,893        12,080    12,503    12,747    12,933        
828,031  703,045  751,737  11,325    11,569    11,755    12,230    12,473        12,660    13,084    13,327    13,514        
828,031  703,045  791,302  11,595    11,838    12,025    12,499    12,743        12,930    13,353    13,597    13,783        









 Kepulauan Riau 
Model Fit Test for Kepulauan Riau 
Period Band  Volume Error 
Jul-16 SAI -5800.34 -2823.17% 
  SP 6391.655 -42.48% 
  ITP 8728.939 55.87% 
  HI 5604.939 -63.12% 
  SBM 6852.222 -39.97% 
Aug-16 SAI -3082.23 -1250.09% 
  SP 9025.766 -11.75% 
  ITP 11150.67 335.57% 
  HI 8184.672 -36.95% 
  SBM 9400.578 -40.76% 
Sep-16 SAI -1665.62 -881.98% 
  SP 10457.15 -5.90% 
  ITP 12229.37 118.38% 
Payoff ITP Lower ITP 706,765      706,765  706,765  743,963  743,963      743,963  781,161  781,161  781,161  
SG CCI ST/HI 749,171      788,601  828,031  749,171  788,601      828,031  749,171  788,601  828,031  
749,171  636,088  751,737  ###### 95,009    94,283    95,050    94,324        93,599    94,365    93,640    92,914    
749,171  636,088  791,302  95,006        94,281    93,555    94,322    93,596        92,871    93,637    92,912    92,186    
749,171  636,088  830,867  94,278        93,553    92,827    93,594    92,868        92,143    92,909    92,184    91,458    
749,171  669,567  751,737  95,118        94,393    93,667    94,434    93,708        92,983    93,749    93,024    92,298    
749,171  669,567  791,302  94,390        93,665    92,939    93,706    92,980        92,255    93,021    92,296    91,570    
749,171  669,567  830,867  93,662        92,937    92,211    92,978    92,252        91,527    92,293    91,568    90,842    
749,171  703,045  751,737  94,502        93,777    93,051    93,818    93,092        92,367    93,133    92,408    91,682    
749,171  703,045  791,302  93,774        93,049    92,323    93,090    92,364        91,639    92,405    91,680    90,954    
749,171  703,045  830,867  93,046        92,321    91,595    92,362    91,636        90,911    91,677    90,952    90,226    
788,601  636,088  751,737  95,009        94,283    93,558    94,324    93,599        92,873    93,640    92,914    92,189    
788,601  636,088  791,302  94,281        93,555    92,830    93,596    92,871        92,145    92,912    92,186    91,461    
788,601  636,088  830,867  93,553        92,827    92,102    92,868    92,143        91,417    92,184    91,458    90,733    
788,601  669,567  751,737  94,393        93,667    92,942    93,708    92,983        92,257    93,024    92,298    91,573    
788,601  669,567  791,302  93,665        92,939    92,214    92,980    92,255 91,529    92,296    91,570    90,845    
788,601  669,567  830,867  92,937        92,211    91,486    92,252    91,527        90,801    91,568    90,842    90,117    
788,601  703,045  751,737  93,777        93,051    92,326    93,092    92,367        91,641    92,408    91,682    90,957    
788,601  703,045  791,302  93,049        92,323    91,598    92,364    91,639        90,913    91,680    90,954    90,229    
788,601  703,045  830,867  92,321        91,595    90,870    91,636    90,911        90,185    90,952    90,226    89,501    
828,031  636,088  751,737  94,283        93,558    92,832    93,599    92,873        92,148    92,914    92,189    91,463    
828,031  636,088  791,302  93,555        92,830    92,104    92,871    92,145        91,420    92,186    91,461    90,735    
828,031  636,088  830,867  92,827        92,102    91,376    92,143    91,417        90,692    91,458    90,733    90,007    
828,031  669,567  751,737  93,667        92,942    92,216    92,983    92,257        91,532    92,298    91,573    90,847    
828,031  669,567  791,302  92,939        92,214    91,488    92,255    91,529        90,804    91,570    90,845    90,119    
828,031  669,567  830,867  92,211        91,486    90,760    91,527    90,801        90,076    90,842    90,117    89,391    
828,031  703,045  751,737  93,051        92,326    91,600    92,367    91,641        90,916    91,682    90,957    90,231    
828,031  703,045  791,302  92,323        91,598    90,872    91,639    90,913        90,188    90,954    90,229    89,503    




Period Band  Volume Error 
  HI 9735.371 -35.95% 
  SBM 10989.6 -3.72% 
Regression Formula 
Jul-16 Volume = - 0.0208 Price - 96.7 Period + 34093 M1 + 32586 M2 + 33687 M3   
 
         + 33103 M4 + 32820 M5 + 31628 M6 + 28497 M7 + 30851 M8 + 31873 
M9   
 
         + 34836 M10 + 35333 M11 + 33866 M12 - 11344 SAI + 848 SP + 2531 
ITP   
          - 593 HI             
Aug-16 Volume = - 0.0176 Price - 84.8 Period + 31114 M1 + 29658 M2 + 30730 M3   
 
         + 30101 M4 + 29721 M5 + 28592 M6 + 26117 M7 + 27872 M8 + 28925 
M9   
 
         + 31837 M10 + 32343 M11 + 30825 M12 - 11377 SAI + 731 SP + 2303 
ITP   
          - 663 HI             
Sep-16 Volume = - 0.0138 Price - 78.0 Period + 27965 M1 + 26575 M2 + 27620 M3   
 
         + 26945 M4 + 26460 M5 + 25412 M6 + 22849 M7 + 25120 M8 + 25825 
M9   
 
         + 28687 M10 + 29210 M11 + 27639 M12 - 11694 SAI + 328 SP + 1670 
ITP   
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